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ABSTRACT 
This document summarizes my program of research that utilized a motivated 
reasoning perspective to examine factors that contribute to prejudice, discrimination and 
victim blame.  After briefly introducing the work, I start with a review of motivated 
reasoning, and in particular system justification theory, as a theoretical backdrop with 
which to examine work ethic and just-world beliefs.  Study 1 examined the effects of 
individual differences in endorsement of work ethic, applicant race, and resume quality 
on thoughts, impressions, and support for hiring in response to an individual applying for 
a job.  Results indicated that when participants high in work-ethic beliefs were presented 
with an applicant whose resume quality was low and who was also Black, they were 
motivated to use the resume quality information as an additional piece of evidence to 
justify disadvantaged group status. Studies 2 and 3 examined the role of an applicant’s 
sexual orientation, source of infection, and participants’ beliefs regarding whether sexual 
orientation as a choice in predicting support for admittance to a free prescription drug 
coverage program for individuals with HIV/AIDS. These studies found that when 
infection was uncontrollable, participants who believe that sexual orientation is a choice 
were less likely to support admittance for the gay (vs. heterosexual) applicant. In other 
words, these participants appear to have used the sexual orientation of the gay applicant 
as a way to explain infection (when infection was uncontrollable), thereby reducing the 
threat to their just world beliefs and justifying the system where gay men are a 
disadvantaged group.  Study 3 also examined motivation to control prejudice as a 
competing motive that overrode these effects. Finally, Studies 4 and 5 examined 
individual differences in endorsement of just-world beliefs as a moderator of the effect of 
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justice primes on victim blame (Studies 4 and 5) and derogation (Study 5) in response to 
someone who has been laid off from their job.  Results showed that priming justice-
related values influenced both those low and high in endorsement of just-world beliefs, 
such that the justice-related primes resulted in increased system justification tendencies 
(i.e., greater victim blame and derogation) among those high in just-world beliefs. 
However, among those low in just-world beliefs, priming justice-related values resulted 
in reduced victim blame and derogation, indicating that the primes made these 
participants more aware of their beliefs that the system is not just. Together these studies 
help demonstrate the effects that motivated reasoning, and in particular the motive to 
system-justify, has on responses to others facing a wide variety of circumstances.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The role of personal motives and goals on cognitive processes has been an issue 
of debate in psychology for decades.  During the 1970s, the notion that cognition is 
influenced by motivation was widely criticized by researchers who claimed that 
motivational effects could be explained away in non-motivational terms.  For example, 
Miller and Ross (1975) argued that self-serving biases could be attributed to beliefs that 
those self-serving conclusions were more likely, rather than being the result of biased 
processing, consistent with the prevailing perspective that dominated research on social 
cognition during that time.  Specifically, information processing was thought to occur 
similarly to the way computers function, including the processes of encoding, storage, 
and retrieval of information (see Schneider, 1991 for a review).   
As the debate continued into the 1980s, there was greater acknowledgment of the 
role of affect in information processing (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 1983), resulting in an 
increase in research on motivated reasoning (a.k.a. motivated cognition; Kruglanski & 
Freund, 1983).  This work has repeatedly found that people’s motives, whether chronic or 
situationally invoked, or accuracy or directionally driven, influence the processing of 
information in a variety of ways (Kunda, 1990; Kruglanski, 1990; Kruglanski, 1996; 
Kruglanski & Ajzen, 1983).  Specifically, people’s motives are thought to influence how 
and which cognitive processes and representations are utilized when processing 
information (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Kunda, 1987; Sorrentino & Higgins, 1986).  
Motivated reasoning has now been studied within a large number of domains, including 
in work on attitudes (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Kruglanski & Thompson, 
1999), impression formation (Cialdini, Trost & Newsom, 1995; Darley & Gross, 1983), 
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self-perception (Dunning, Leuenberger, & Sherman, 1995), political ideology (Jost, 
Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003a), and stereotype activation and application 
(Kunda & Sinclair, 1999; Kunda & Spencer, 2003).  Such a perspective has resulted in 
some major changes in how social scientists look at these important issues.  For example, 
work on the motive to justify the system (e.g., governmental, economic, social, etc.) has 
added greatly to our understanding of attitudes toward members of advantaged and 
disadvantaged groups (Jost & Burgess, 2000; Jost, Pelham, Sheldon, & Sullivan, 2003b; 
Kay et al., 2009; Phelan & Rudman, 2011).   
Although research utilizing this motivated reasoning perspective is growing, I 
believe there are areas that could benefit from this perspective but have been overlooked.  
For example, in the current work I propose that a motivated reasoning perspective can be 
useful in interpreting the results of my program of research on the effects of work ethic 
and just-world beliefs.   Specifically, I propose that a system-justification (a form of 
motivated reasoning) perspective can help to understand the effects of work ethic and 
just-world beliefs on victim blame, derogation and prejudice.   
In the following chapters I start with a review of relevant literature, including 
literature on motivated reasoning (Chapter 2), system justification, work ethic, and just-
world beliefs (Chapter 3).  In Chapters 4 through 6  I present my program of research, 
including five studies examining the effects of work ethic (Study 1; Chapter 4) and just-
world beliefs (Studies 2 to 5; Chapters 5 and 6) from a motivated reasoning perspective.  
The final chapter (Chapter 7) discusses how the studies contribute to the current literature 
and provides suggestions for future research.   
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Chapter 2 begins with a discussion of chronic information processing motives as 
they relate to cognition.  Specifically, chronic information processing motives are general 
individual differences in how people prefer to process information, such as individual 
differences in the need for closure (i.e., wanting to come to conclusions quickly; 
Kruglanski, 1990), preference for consistency (Cialdini et al., 1995), and tolerance for 
ambiguity (Budner, 1962; Herman, Stevens, Bird, Mendenhall, & Oddou, 2010).  I then 
move on to discuss situational motives, including both accuracy and directional goals.  
As will be discussed in detail, accuracy goals can be activated by a variety of 
circumstances, such as when one knows that they will have to justify their conclusions or 
judgments to another (e.g., Kruglanski & Freund, 1983).  Although not always the case, 
accuracy goals tend to result in less biased processing of information (Pittman & 
D’Agostino, 1985; Tetlock, 1985), whereas directional goals tend to lead to biased 
processing aimed at reaching desired conclusions, resulting in outcomes such as self-
serving biases (Dunning et al., 1995) and skewed judgments of others (Klein & Kunda, 
1992).   
In Chapter 3, I start by reviewing the literature on system justification, work ethic, 
and just-world beliefs, including a discussion on how the constructs are related.  I then 
discuss my program of research examining the effects of work ethic and just-world 
beliefs on victim blame and derogation, prejudice, and discrimination, including how this 
research is guided by a motivated reasoning/system justification perspective.  Both work 
ethic and just-world beliefs are associated with other constructs that have been studied 
from a motivated reasoning perspective, including political ideology (Jost et al., 2003a) 
and stereotyping (Kunda & Sinclair, 1999).  I propose that an examination previous 
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research, as well as my own program of research, may start a dialogue on the role of 
motivated reasoning in work ethic and just-world beliefs that can be used to guide future 
research on these constructs.   
After reviewing the relevant literature, I include three chapters consisting of 
studies examining the effects of work ethic and just-world beliefs on victim blame, 
derogation, and prejudice from a motivated reasoning/system justification perspective.  
Study 1 (Chapter 4) presents my work examining the effect of work-ethic beliefs on 
thoughts and impressions in a hiring situation.  Based on a motivated reasoning (i.e., 
system justification) perspective, the primary hypothesis was that endorsement of work-
ethic beliefs would interact with the applicant’s race to moderate the effects of previous 
experience (i.e., resume quality) on thoughts and impressions about the applicant, as well 
as support for hiring the applicant.  Specifically, those low in endorsement of work-ethic 
beliefs were expected to have more positive thoughts and impressions, and report greater 
support for hiring, when the applicant’s work experience was consistent with the 
requirements of the position, regardless of applicant race.  This would be consistent with 
research indicating that those low in endorsement of work-ethic beliefs tend to have more 
positive attitudes towards Blacks, including lower endorsement of beliefs that Blacks 
violate work-ethic ideals (Biernat, Vescio, & Theno, 1996).  However, when previous 
work experience was inconsistent with the requirements of the position, participants high 
in endorsement of work-ethic beliefs were expected to report more positive thoughts and 
impressions, and greater support for hiring, in response to a White applicant (favoritism 
for the advantaged group; all participants were White) than a Black applicant (derogation 
of the disadvantaged group).   
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I argue that these results would be consistent with a system justification 
perspective for two reasons.  First, those who strongly endorse work-ethic beliefs justify 
both advantaged and disadvantaged group status by reasoning that status is the result of 
how much effort is put into succeeding.  As a result, those who strongly endorse work-
ethic beliefs tend to be more prejudiced towards members of typically disadvantaged 
groups, such as Blacks, and have a stronger favorability bias towards advantaged groups, 
such as Whites.  Second, because work-ethic beliefs are used to justify favoritism toward 
advantaged groups and derogation of disadvantaged groups, I propose that individuals 
high in work-ethic beliefs are likely more sensitive to situations where they can utilize 
those beliefs to justify continued favoritism for advantaged groups and derogation of 
disadvantaged groups.  Together, these arguments led to the prediction that when 
participants high in work-ethic beliefs are presented with an applicant whose previous 
work experience did not match the job description, they would be motivated to use this 
information as an additional piece of evidence to justify continued favoritism toward 
advantaged groups and derogation of disadvantaged groups, resulting in more negative 
thoughts and impressions, and less support for hiring, for the Black applicant.  
Additionally, it was predicted that this would result in favoritism for the advantaged 
group such that the White applicant would be judged similarly to those applicant’s whose 
qualifications did match the job description, indicating that these participants were 
motivated to overlook this flaw for members of the advantaged group as a way to justify 
those advantages.   
Studies 2 and 3 (Chapter 5; Murray, Aberson, Blankenship, & Highfield, 2013) 
utilize just-world theory (Lerner, 1980; Lerner & Simmons, 1966) to make predictions 
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about reactions to an HIV positive male applying for a free prescription drug coverage 
program.  Specifically, when infection was uncontrollable, I proposed that participants 
who believe sexual orientation is a choice would be less likely to support admittance to 
the drug coverage program when the applicant is gay rather than heterosexual.  This 
would be consistent with participants searching for a reason (i.e., sexual orientation) to 
attribute blame to the victim even when infection was uncontrollable.  The second study 
adds motivation to control prejudice as an additional predictor, with the expectation that 
the effects just described would only occur among participants who both believe that 
orientation is a choice and who are also low in motivation to control prejudice.   
These hypotheses are consistent with both system justification (Jost & Banaji, 
1994) and just world (Lerner, 1977; 1980) perspectives.  First, when faced with a threat 
to just-world beliefs, participants would search for a reason to explain infection in order 
to maintain these beliefs.  Second, participants who believe sexual orientation is a choice 
would utilize these beliefs to justify the infection when the applicant was gay, including 
justification of prejudiced responses (i.e., less support for admittance).  In other words, 
these participants would utilize their beliefs that sexual orientation is a choice as a way to 
justify prejudice, consistent with a system justification perspective.  Additionally, I 
believe this work advances research on motivated reasoning as well as just world and 
system justification theories.  Specifically, there has been little theorizing on how 
conflicting motives (i.e., just-world beliefs and motivation to control prejudice) influence 
information processing and to my knowledge there has been little to no discussion of 
what factors may override the motives to maintain just-world beliefs or justify the 
system.   
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Finally, Studies 4 and 5 build upon the previous studies by examining the role of 
individual differences in endorsement of just-world beliefs and priming of justice-related 
values in response to an individual who had been laid off from their job and whose group 
status is unknown (e.g., race unknown).  Specifically, these studies examined the 
potential moderating role of endorsement of just-world beliefs on the effects of priming 
justice-related values on participant’s judgments of a victim. It was expected that among 
those who strongly endorse just-world beliefs, participants primed with justice-related 
values would blame (Studies 4 and 5) and derogate (Study 5) the victim to a greater 
degree than when exposed to the control primes. In other words, activation of justice-
related values through priming was expected to increase victim blame and derogation 
among those who strongly endorse just-world beliefs.  
In sum, the following chapters will start with a review of the current literature on 
motivated reasoning, including a discussion of how chronic and situational motives 
influence processing in a number of domains (Chapter 2).  Second, I discuss the current 
state of research on system justification, work ethic, and just-world beliefs, as well as the 
relationship between these constructs (Chapter 3).  Third, I present my program of 
research, including five studies examining the effects of work ethic and just-world beliefs 
on victim blame and derogation, prejudice, and discrimination from a system justification 
perspective (Chapters 4-6).  Finally, I briefly review the work presented in the five 
studies and discuss possible directions for future research (Chapter 7).   
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CHAPTER II: MOTIVATED REASONING 
Motivated reasoning (a.k.a. motivated cognition) refers to the influence that 
motives and goals have on cognitive processing (Kunda, 1990).  Broadly, theories on 
motivated reasoning propose that one’s motives and goals influence how and which 
cognitive processes are used when making judgments (Kunda, 1990; Kruglanski, 1990; 
Kruglanski, 1996; Kruglanski & Ajzen, 1983).  These goals and motives can be chronic 
or situationally driven, both influencing cognition at many levels, including how 
information is encoded, stored, and organized in memory, as well as the process of 
retrieval of information from memory (Klein & Kunda, 1992; Kruglanski, 1996; Kunda, 
1990).   
One commonly cited theory that has guided research on motivated reasoning is 
Kruglanski’s lay epistemic theory (1980; 1989), which proposes that motives can be 
classified along two dimensions: seeking versus avoiding closure, and specific versus 
non-specific motives.  On one end of the seeking versus avoiding closure dimension is 
the preference to come to conclusions quickly (i.e., seeking closure), and at the other is 
the preference to avoid coming to a conclusion (i.e., avoiding closure).  Where one falls 
on this dimension can be either situationally induced, such as when time pressure 
increases closure seeking, or chronic, as with someone who is generally high in need for 
closure.  The second dimension, specific versus non-specific motives, refers to processing 
information with the goal of either coming to a specific conclusion or not.  Non-specific 
motives are thought to be more focused on accuracy, whereas specific motivations tend to 
be directional in nature.   
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In the following sections I will review the work on motivated reasoning by 
focusing on the effects of both chronic and situational motives on processing information 
about others.  Specifically, I will start off with a discussion of the role of individual 
differences in how people prefer to process information (i.e., chronic information 
processing motives) followed by a discussion of situational motives.  The review of 
situational motives will include the role of both accuracy and directional goals and how 
they lead to processing information in different ways.   
Chronic Information Processing Motives 
Chronic information processing motives include general individual differences in 
people’s motives when processing information, such as the preference to come to 
conclusions quickly (i.e., need for closure; Kruglanski, 1990).  Research on chronic 
information processing motives has spurred the creation of several individual difference 
measures, including need for closure (Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993; Roets & Van 
Hiel, 2007), preference for consistency (Cialdini et al., 1995) and tolerance for ambiguity 
(Budner, 1962; Herman et al., 2010).  What all of these measures have in common is that 
they reflect individual differences in how people prefer to process information.   
Individual differences in chronic information processing motives.  The 
greatest amount of research on the role of chronic information processing motives (i.e., 
individual differences in motivated processing) has come from work examining the role 
need for closure in information processing (e.g., Kruglanski & Webster, 1996).  This 
work proposes that those high in need for closure are more susceptible to primacy and 
recency effects, tending to “seize” on the first available information from which they can 
form an opinion, and then “freeze” on evaluation, failing to integrate new information 
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into their evaluations (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994).  
Consistent with this perspective, Kruglanski and colleagues have found that closure-
motives influence several phenomena in social psychology, including impression 
formation, persuasion, and stereotyping (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Kruglanski et al., 
1993).  For example, when instructed to form an impression before receiving information 
about a target, those high in need for closure are more prone to primacy effects, such that 
their impressions are influenced to a greater degree by information presented early during 
judgment formation (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994).  On the other hand, when they are 
told to form an impression after they have received information about a target, they are 
more prone to recency effects (Richter & Kruglanski, 1998).   
 Although not as extensive, research examining individual differences in 
preference for consistency (Cialdini et al., 1995), tolerance for ambiguity (Bennett, 
Herold, & Ashford, 1990), and need for cognition (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984; Perlini 
& Hansen, 2001) have found that they also function as motives that influence how 
information is processed.  For example, those high in preference for consistency are more 
prone to the foot in the door effect (i.e., commitment to an initial small request leads to 
consistent responding to additional requests; Cialdini et al., 1995).  This work indicates 
that individual differences in the motive to remain consistent influence how people 
process commitment requests, and in turn, their willingness to comply with increasingly 
demanding requests.  A study examining the motivational effect of tolerance for 
ambiguity found that those low in tolerance for ambiguity were more persistent in 
seeking feedback in a work setting, indicating that their motivation to avoid ambiguity 
led them to seek information that reduce any feelings of ambiguity (Bennett et al., 1990).  
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Additionally, work examining the role of individual differences in need for cognition 
found that those low in need for cognition are more prone to the attractiveness bias (i.e., 
attractive = good), such that those low in need for cognition attributed more socially 
desirable traits to attractive individuals than those high in need for cognition (Perlini & 
Hansen, 2001).  In sum, this work demonstrates the power of various motives in how 
information is processed and how these motives can influence the need to seek out 
information in various settings.   
Situational Motives 
Situational motives can influence processing in a number of ways.  For example, 
if motivated to come to an accurate (i.e., correct) conclusion, one might put more effort 
into processing information when making a judgment (Kunda, 1990; Simmons, LeBoeuf, 
& Nelson, 2010).  On the other hand, if motivated to come to a particular (i.e., 
directional) conclusion, one may process information in a biased manner that leads to the 
desired conclusion (Kruglanski, 1996; Kunda, 1990).  Several lines of research have 
demonstrated that various situational factors can lead to motives/goals that influence how 
information is processed (Dunning et al., 1995; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Kunda & 
Sanitiso, 1989).  In the following sections I will review how both accuracy and 
directional goals influence processing of information about others, including how these 
goals can lead to biased judgments.   
Accuracy goals.  As implied by its label, accuracy goals result in the use of 
information processing strategies deemed most likely to lead to a “correct” conclusion 
(Chen & Chaiken, 1999; Kruglanski & Ajzen, 1983; Kunda, 1990).  Specifically, the 
motivation to be accurate (i.e., non-specific closure) generally results in greater effort 
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when processing information, which may reduce biases and errors that result from 
processing in a more quick and less effortful manner (Kunda, 1990; Tetlock, 1985).  For 
example, several studies have found that accuracy motives can decrease primacy effects 
(Kruglanski & Freund, 1983), as well as the occurrence and magnitude of the 
fundamental attribution error (Pittman & D’Agostino, 1985; Tetlock, 1985).  Of course, 
the accuracy motive does not necessarily lead to correct or even objective evaluations and 
even biased people can believe they are acting objectively (Kruglanski, 1980; Kunda, 
1990; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987).  Instead, accuracy motives tend to reduce the 
occurrence of these biases, rather than eliminating them.   
Many situations can lead to the activation of accuracy goals, such as when one 
knows they will have to justify their conclusions to others or when decisions will have 
future consequences.  For example, Kruglanski and Freund (1983) manipulated accuracy 
goals by either informing or not informing participants that they would have to justify 
their judgments about a job applicant’s potential for success.  Participants listened to an 
audio tape describing a job candidate which was manipulated such that either positive or 
negative information was presented first, priming them to have either a positive or 
negative impression of the target.  When they were led to believe that they would have to 
justify their judgments about the applicants potential for success, participants were less 
prone to primacy effects, meaning that the order of the information had less of an effect 
on participants who knew they would have to justify their opinions.   
 Research examining the effect of situationally induced accuracy goals on the 
fundamental attribution error has found that these goals tend to reduce biased judgments 
(Pittman & D’Agostino, 1985; Tetlock, 1985).  For example, one study examined the 
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effect of situationally induced accuracy goals on the prevalence of the fundamental 
attribution error (Tetlock, 1985).  In this work, participants read an essay that was either 
for or against affirmative action.  The researchers randomly assigned participants to 
conditions where they were either told that the author was able to choose their position in 
the essay or that they were assigned a viewpoint (i.e., no choice).  Participants were then 
instructed to give their impressions of the essay writer, with half told that their 
impressions would be completely anonymous (low accuracy motivation) and half told 
that they would have to justify their impressions (high accuracy motivation).  Those told 
that their impressions were anonymous demonstrated the fundamental attribution error, in 
that their impressions were influenced by the stance taken in the essay even when aware 
that the essay writer did not have a choice in which position they took.  On the other 
hand, those in the high accuracy motivation condition (thought they would have to justify 
their positions), were much less likely to fall prey to the fundamental attribution error, 
and thus their impressions were influenced to a much lesser degree when they knew the 
essay writer had no choice over their position.   
Directional goals.  Although accuracy goals have spurred a great deal of 
research, the overwhelming majority of work on motivated reasoning has focused on 
directional goals.  When considering the role of directional motives on information 
processing, it is important to keep in mind that even with directional goals, people still 
need to feel as if they came to their conclusion in a logical manner (Darley & Gross, 
1983; Kunda, 1990).  As outlined by Kunda (1990), motivational goals lead people to 
examine their prior knowledge and beliefs in such a way as to find support for their 
desired conclusion.  However, if they are unable to find the needed information to 
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support their desired conclusion, the directional motives may have little impact on the 
final outcome.  In other words, no matter how strong the motivation, the effect of motives 
on cognition is thought to be constrained by reality (except, perhaps, in the case of 
extreme ideology).   
Even with this limitation, directional motives regularly influence how information 
is processed (Kunda, 1990; Kruglanski, 1996).  For example, directional motives can 
influence the occurrence of self-serving biases (Dunning et al., 1995) and change 
people’s reports of their own self-conceptions (Kunda & Sanitioso, 1989).  In the study 
by Kunda and Sanitioso (1989), participants were led to believe that different personal 
attributes were associated with a desirable outcome, which in turn led to greater self-
reports of possessing those attributes.  Specifically, student participants were randomly 
assigned to read the results of fictitious study reporting that either extroversion or 
introversion was associated with greater success and were asked to write their opinion 
about why these results might be true.  Participants then completed a supposed second 
study where they rated themselves on various traits, including extroversion and 
introversion.  They found that participants rated themselves as higher in extroversion or 
introversion depending on which they were led to believe was associated with success.  
In other words, participants were situationally motivated to view themselves as 
extroverted or introverted depending on which they believed was most associated with 
later success.   
Much of the work on situationally driven directional goals has focused on how 
they can influence judgments of others, such as when another person’s abilities and 
performance will influence one’s own outcomes (Klein & Kunda, 1992).  For example, 
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one study manipulated participant’s motives to view a target individual as either high or 
low in ability by telling participants that the target would either be their partner or 
opponent in a game (i.e., manipulated self-interest; Klein & Kunda, 1992).  They found 
that when participants thought the target would be their partner in the game, they rated 
them as higher in ability and reported that ability (vs. luck) played a greater role in the 
outcome of the game.  These results demonstrate that even when given the same 
information about the target, participant’s motives influenced their judgments in a way 
that makes them seem most likely to succeed.   
A major focus of the work examining the role of directional goals on judgments 
of others has been within the stereotypes and prejudice domain.  For example, Klein and 
Kunda (1992) conducted a study where they manipulated whether participants thought 
they would be interacting with someone with schizophrenia and then had participants 
complete a measure assessing their stereotypes about schizophrenics.  They found that 
when participants thought they would be interacting with a person with schizophrenia, 
they endorsed more positive stereotypes about schizophrenics.  These results indicate that 
the participants who knew they would be interacting with someone with schizophrenia 
were motivated to view schizophrenics more positively (i.e., motivated to believe the 
interaction would be positive), resulting in positively altering their stereotypes of 
schizophrenics overall.  These findings are consistent with other work by Kunda and 
colleagues (i.e., Kunda & Sinclair, 1999; Kunda & Spencer, 2003) that has repeatedly 
demonstrated that motives and goals influence the activation and application of 
stereotypes.   
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Finally, although much of the research on the effect of need for closure has 
focused on individual differences, several studies have examined how situationally 
inducing need for closure can influence information processing (e.g., Ford & Kruglanski, 
1995; Kruglanski et al., 1993).  For example, Kruglanski and Webster (1991) 
situationally induced need for closure by manipulating the level of noise in the 
environment (noisy vs. quiet; noise induces need for closure), during a task where a 
group was in charge of making a decision.  They found that those in a noisy environment 
(i.e., high need for closure) were more likely to reject someone voicing a deviating 
opinion than those in a quiet environment (i.e., low need for closure).  In other words, 
when in a noisy environment, participants were motivated to come to a conclusion 
quickly and thus rejected dissenting opinions.   
As shown here, there are many examples in the literature of directional motives 
driven by various situational factors.  For example, in situations where we have to make 
judgments about others, directional goals may influence those judgments when the other 
person’s character or abilities may influence our own outcomes (e.g., Klein & Kunda, 
1992).  Overall, these studies demonstrate that the situation can be very powerful in 
inducing directional motives that lead to biased processing (Ford & Kruglanski, 1995; 
Kunda, 1990).   
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CHAPTER III: SYSTEM JUSTIFICATION, WORK ETHIC, AND JUST-WORLD 
BELIEFS 
 In this chapter I review the literature on three types of motivated reasoning, 
including system justification, work ethic, and just-world beliefs.  As part of this review, 
I discuss the link between each of these motives and political conservatism, stereotypes 
and prejudice, as well as the extent that these motives are related.  Specifically, previous 
research and theorizing suggests that both work ethic and just-world beliefs are types of a 
more general system justification motive (e.g., Jost & Hunyady, 2005).  In other words, it 
has been proposed that individual differences in the extent that people endorse work ethic 
and just-world beliefs reflects differences in the extent that people are motivated to 
justify the system.  After reviewing the relevant literature and discussing the relationship 
between these constructs, I discuss how a system justification perspective can be utilized 
to help understand and generate hypotheses for the effects of work ethic and just-world 
beliefs on victim blame, derogation, and prejudice.   
System Justification 
System justification theory proposes that individuals have a general motive to 
believe that the current system (e.g., economic, social, political) is fair and just (Jost & 
Banaji, 1994).  The theory  argues that this motive results in defense the status quo, even 
in situations where existing social standards are inconsistent with one’s beliefs or are 
non-beneficial to the self (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Jost, Pelham, & Carvallo, 2002).  
As a result, it is proposed that in order to justify the system, people will attribute 
characteristics to both themselves and others that are consistent with their social standing, 
whether they are positive or negative (Jost & Banaji, 1994).  Proponents of system 
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justification theory argue that the motivation to justify the system comes from the desire 
to decrease any threat or anxiety that may arise from being part of a system that at times 
can be unfair or undesirable (Jost & Hunyady, 2002; Kay et al., 2008; Kay et al., 2009).   
One consequence of the motive to justify the system is that people may endorse 
stereotypes or support social policy that results in inequality, as a way to avoid the feeling 
of threat that may come from acknowledging that they are part of an unfair system (Jost 
& Hunyady, 2002; Kay et al., 2009).  In fact, much of the work on system justification 
has focused how stereotypes are used to justify differences among groups.  For example, 
both men and women tend to attribute the characteristics of ‘nurturing’ to women and 
‘autonomous’ to men (Eagly, 1995; Eagly & Steffen, 1984) and in turn these stereotypes 
are then used to justify the system in which women take primary responsibility for 
childrearing (Jost & Banaji, 1994).   
One of the primary consequences of system justification is reduced support for 
actions aimed at changing the current system in ways that are aimed at leveling the 
playing field for members of disadvantaged groups.  For example, system justification 
has been used to help explain why members of low socioeconomic status often oppose 
social welfare programs (Gilens, 1999; Jost et al., 2004) and has been linked to less 
support for affirmative action policies (Phelan & Rudman, 2011).  This is consistent with 
work demonstrating that system justification reduces moral outrage and intentions to help 
those who are disadvantaged (Wakslak et al., 2007).  In other words, the system 
justification motive is associated with reduced support for changing the status quo, even 
among members of disadvantaged groups (Jost et al., 2003b; Jost et al., 2004; Kay et al., 
2009; Wakslak et al., 2007).   
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System justification and conservatism.  Another major focus of the research on 
system justification is the relationship between individual differences in the need to 
justify the system and support for conservative policies and values (e.g., Jost et al., 
2003a).  Specifically, system justification has been shown to be tied to political 
conservatism, with political conservatives tending to score higher on measures of system 
justification (e.g., Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008).  Several studies have also found a link 
between political conservatism behavior consistent with system justification (Feygina, 
Jost, & Goldsmith, 2010).  For example, one set of studies indicated that the link between 
political conservatism and denial of global climate change could in part be explained by 
individual differences in the tendency to engage in system justification (Feygina et al., 
2010).  Other work has demonstrated that politically conservative members of both 
advantaged and disadvantaged groups are more likely to show favoritism for the 
advantaged group in comparison to less conservative individuals, consistent with 
predictions from system justification theory (Jost et al., 2003a; Jost et al., 2004).   
System justification, stereotyping, and prejudice.  As noted, much of the work 
on system justification has focused on its role in stereotyping and prejudice among 
members of both advantaged and disadvantaged groups (Jost & Burgess, 2000; Jost et al., 
2003b; Kay et al., 2009; Phelan & Rudman, 2011).  This work has repeatedly found that 
members of both advantaged and disadvantaged groups tend to endorse negative 
stereotypes about disadvantaged groups and to engage in prejudiced behaviors (Jost & 
Burgess, 2000; Jost et al., 2002).  For example, in one study both Latino and Asian 
participants displayed outgroup favoritism by tending to pick someone who was White 
(rather than from their own group) when asked to choose a partner to interact with during 
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a study (Jost et al., 2002).  In other words, they were showing a preference to interact 
with a member of an advantaged group rather than their own.  These results are consistent 
with other work demonstrating that system justification is associated with reduced 
support for affirmative action among both members of groups who would and would not 
receive benefit from it (Phlean & Rudman, 2011).   
Work-Ethic Beliefs 
Much of the theorizing on the work-ethic beliefs, which at their most basic are 
beliefs about the link between hard work and success, is based on the work of Weber 
(1930).  Weber argued that traditional work-ethic beliefs, which include the idea that 
through hard work anyone is capable of success and wealth, are the basis for capitalism.  
Specifically, work-ethic related values, which emphasize the importance of continuously 
working hard and the ability for anyone to succeed if they work hard enough, are argued 
to be strongly related to capitalist ideals and provide moral justification for wealth 
inequality (Atieh, Brief, & Vollrath, 1987; Weber, 1930).  In other words, if anyone can 
succeed if they work hard enough, lack of success (e.g., being poor) is assumed to be due 
to personal failings.   
Within psychology, work-ethic beliefs are typically conceptualized as an 
individual difference variable associated with individualism and beliefs about the 
importance of hard work (Furnham, 1987; Katz & Hass, 1988).  Individuals who strongly 
endorse work-ethic beliefs tend to believe that whether one succeeds or not is due to their 
own willingness to work hard, and failure to achieve personal and financial success is due 
to a lack of hard work, rather than other factors, such as prejudice (Biernat et al., 1996; 
Katz & Hass, 1988).  This perspective is consistent with research that has found that 
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those who strongly endorse work-ethic beliefs tend to be more conservative, have a 
higher internal locus of control, and tend to place greater importance on self-control 
generally (Furnham, 1987; Furnham & Bland, 1983; MacDonald, 1971; Mudrack, 1997).   
Work-ethic beliefs and conservatism.  Much of the research on work ethic has 
focused on the relationship between work-ethic beliefs and support for conservative 
policies and values (Atieh et al., 1987; Christopher, Zabel, Jones, & Marek, 2008; 
Feather, 1984; Furnham & Bland, 1983).  For example, one study examining the 
relationship between endorsement of traditional work-ethic beliefs and conservatism 
found that those who strongly endorse work-ethic beliefs tend to score higher on 
measures of conservatism and endorsement of conservative values, such as obedience and 
self-control (Feather, 1984).  These findings are consistent with research indicating that 
those endorsing work-ethic beliefs tend to be less supportive social policies/programs 
aimed at disadvantaged groups and that are typically rejected by political conservatives, 
such as welfare programs (Hasenfeld & Rafferty, 1989; MacDonald, 1971; Somerman, 
1993).  In sum, research has consistently found this link between endorsement of the 
work-ethic beliefs and conservatism, both in the relationship between the two constructs 
and with specific social policies.   
Work-ethic beliefs, stereotyping, and prejudice.  Another area that has major 
focus of research on work-ethic beliefs has been on the relationship between endorsement 
of work-ethic beliefs, stereotyping, and prejudice.  Specifically, multiple researchers have 
proposed that work-ethic beliefs are used to justify negative attitudes and prejudice 
towards outgroups (e.g., Katz & Hass, 1988; Kinder & Sears, 1981; Malcomnson, 
Christopher, Franzen, & Keyes, 2006).  For example, several studies have demonstrated 
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that endorsement of work-ethic beliefs is associated with opinions that Blacks deserve 
their disadvantaged status due to their failure to live up to values associated with work 
ethic ideals (e.g., hard work; Biernat et al., 1996; Katz & Hass, 1988; Kinder & Sears, 
1981).  One study (Biernat et al., 1996) had participants rank the importance of various 
values, including values related to work-ethic beliefs, and then report the extent that 
Blacks supported the same values.  They found that compared to those low in 
endorsement of work-ethic beliefs, participants high in endorsement of work-ethic beliefs 
tended to report that Blacks supported work ethic related values, such as hard work, less 
than Whites.  Those high in work-ethic beliefs also reported more negative attitudes 
towards Blacks, indicating that negative attitudes towards Blacks may be due in part to 
perceived violation of work ethic related values.   
Work-ethic beliefs are also thought to play a role in negative attitudes towards 
gay men and lesbians, women, homeless persons, and overweight people (Crandall, 1994; 
Levy, Freitas, & Salovey, 2002; Malcomnson et al., 2006).  For example, work-ethic 
beliefs have been found to be positively related with negative attitudes towards gay men 
and lesbians, even when controlling for factors such as religious beliefs (Malcomnson et 
al., 2006).  Other work found that work-ethic beliefs were positively related to dislike of 
overweight people and endorsement of the idea that people are overweight due to lack of 
willpower (Crandall, 1994).  Overall, this work demonstrates that endorsement of work-
ethic beliefs is associated with prejudice towards stigmatized groups generally.   
Just-World Beliefs 
One of the most influential theories on the role of justice-related motives is 
Lerner’s just world theory (Lerner, 1980; Lerner & Simmons, 1966).  Lerner proposes 
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that people are motivated to see the world as fair and just; that good things happen to 
good people and bad things to bad people.  Specifically, the theory proposes that people 
feel the need to believe that they have control over their own outcomes, such that they 
will receive rewards and punishments that are consistent with their actions.  As a result, 
when confronted with another person’s suffering, we are motivated to come up with a 
justification for that suffering, allowing for the maintenance of just-world beliefs.  One 
consequence of the need to believe in a just world is that when we are faced with a 
situation where we cannot blame another’s suffering on their actions, we are motivated to 
search for character flaws that can justify their suffering.  In other words, the idea that 
someone may be suffering for no fault of their own is threatening to the need to believe in 
a just world, and people will search for any possible reason to explain the others 
unfortunate outcome.   
One of Lerner’s original studies examined how participants responded to someone 
they believed was another participant (a confederate) that appeared to be receiving 
electric shocks when they made errors in a memory task (Lerner & Simmons, 1966).  
They found that participants who were given an opportunity to end the shocks rated the 
victim as more attractive than when they had no control over the shocks.  In other words, 
they degraded the victim (by rating them as less attractive) when they were not given a 
chance to help them.  These findings are consistent with predictions from just world 
theory, which argues that when you are not able to justify another person’s suffering, or 
able to help them in some way, you instead justify their experience by devaluing them, 
allowing maintenance of just world beliefs.   
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Several studies have shown that maintenance of just-world beliefs is associated 
with a variety of positive outcomes.  For instance, greater endorsement of the belief that 
the world is just has been shown to be associated with better mental health (i.e., 
decreased reports of depression), increased likelihood to reciprocate the kindness of 
others, and decreased occurrence of individuals feeling they are themselves victims of 
discrimination (Dzuka & Dalbert, 2000; Edlund, Sagarin, & Johnson, 2007; Tomaka & 
Blascovich, 1994).  For example, in one study that examined the effects of just-world 
beliefs in people who are unemployed, those who strongly endorsed the belief in a just 
world were less likely to ruminate about their current situation and reported less 
depression (Dalbert, 1997).   
Individual differences in just-world beliefs.  Although just world theory 
proposes that the need to believe in a just world is universal, there is variance in the 
degree that people view the world as just.  In fact, much of the research stemming from 
just world theory has focused on the effects of individual differences in endorsement of 
just-world beliefs.  For example, greater endorsement of just-world beliefs has been 
found to be positively associated with internal locus of control (Lerner, 1980), work-ethic 
beliefs (Furnham & Rajamanickam, 1992; Ghorpade, Lackritz, & Singh, 2006; Jones, 
1997; Mudrack, 2005), political conservatism (Dittmar & Dickenson, 1993; Smith & 
Green, 1984) and right-wing authoritarianism (Lambert, Burroughs, & Nguyen, 1999).   
Individual differences in just-world beliefs have also been shown to influence 
reactions to people seeking social welfare services.  For example, one study used 
vignettes depicting an individual seeking government benefits and manipulated the 
amount of effort the individual had put into improving their situation, such as whether 
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they attended school or currently had a job (Appelbaum, Lennon, & Aber, 2006).  They 
found that among those who strongly endorse just-world beliefs, the more effort the 
person had put in to improving their situation, the less participants rated them as 
deserving of the government benefits.  The opposite was true for those low in just-world 
beliefs, where the more effort the person had put in, the more participants thought they 
were deserving of benefits.  The authors proposed that those high in just-world beliefs 
were less supportive of government benefits when the person had put more effort into 
improving their situation because still needing help after putting in a great deal of effort 
was threatening to participants just world beliefs, and as a result participants derogated 
the target and rated them as less deserving of aid.   
Work examining the role of just-world beliefs on victim blame has found that 
those who strongly endorse just-world beliefs are more likely to blame and derogate 
innocent victims, including victims of crimes such as robbery, spousal abuse, and sexual 
assault (Kristiansen & Giuletti, 2006; Montada, 1998; van den Bos & Maas, 2009), as 
well as victims of diseases such as cancer and AIDS (Braman & Lambert, 2001; Connors 
& Heaven, 1990).  For example, one study examining the role of individual differences in 
just-world beliefs on responses to female victims of spousal abuse found that females 
with higher endorsement of just-world beliefs were more likely to blame the victim for 
the abuse (Kristiansen & Giuletti, 1990).   
Another focus of research on just world-beliefs has been on the extent that people 
believe the world is just for them personally (i.e., personal belief in a just world).  From 
the start of research on the need to believe in a just world, there has been 
acknowledgement that general belief in a just world and personal belief in a just world 
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should be differentiated, as personal experiences of injustice are likely to especially 
threatening (Lerner, 1977).  This perspective is consistent with work that demonstrates 
that people are more likely to deny that injustice or discrimination occurs against one’s 
own group or against the self (Dalbert, 1999; Dalbert & Yamauchi, 1994; Taylor, Wright, 
Moghaddam, & Lalonde, 1990).  Although still relatively limited in scope, research 
examining the effects of personal belief in a just world has demonstrated that those who 
strongly endorse personal beliefs in a just world are less likely to report feelings of 
injustice than those who do endorse personal beliefs in a just world (e.g., Dalbert & Filke, 
2007; Peter & Dalbert, 2010).  For example, prisoners who strongly endorse personal 
beliefs in a just world reported less anger and were more likely to agree that they were 
treated fairly during their experience with the justice system (Dalbert & Filke, 2007).    
Relationships between System Justification, Work Ethic, and Just-World Beliefs 
 Given that system justification, work ethic, and just-world beliefs have all been 
linked to a number of issues studied in social psychology, including individual 
differences in political ideology (Christopher et al., 2008; Dittmar & Dickenson, 1993; 
Furnham, 1987), and responses to innocent victims (Appelbaum et al., 2006; Biernat et 
al., 1996; Braman & Lambert, 2001; Katz & Hass, 1988; van den Bos & Maas, 2009), it 
seems likely that these constructs would be related.  Consistent with this perspective, a 
limited body of work has examined the relationship between work ethic and just-world 
beliefs, as well as how they each relate to system justification (Furnham & 
Rajamanickam, 1992; Ghorpade et al., 2006).  Work examining the relationship between 
work ethic and just-world beliefs has found moderate positive correlations between the 
two constructs.  For example, one study that examined the extent that work-ethic beliefs 
27 
 
are related to other constructs known to be associated with conservatism, including just-
world beliefs, found a moderate positive correlation (r = .35) between them, indicating 
that endorsement of work-ethic beliefs is associated with greater endorsement of just-
world beliefs (Christopher et al., 2008).  These results are consistent with those found in 
other studies (rs = .25 to .50) that utilized various measures of work ethic and just-world 
beliefs (Furnham & Rajamanickam, 1992; Ghorpade et al., 2006; Jones, 1997; Mudrack, 
2005).   
Although this work demonstrates that there is a relationship between work ethic 
and just-world beliefs, there has been little focus on what drives the relationship.  One 
exception to this is some discussion of work ethic and just-world beliefs in the literature 
on system justification theory (Jost et al., 2003a).  As noted, system justification theory 
argues that people are motivated to believe that the system (economic, social, etc.) is fair 
and legitimate (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost & Hunyady, 2005).  It has been proposed that 
work ethic and just-world beliefs can be thought of as reflecting variance in the extent 
that people are motivated to justify the system (Jost & Hunyady, 2005).  Consistent with 
this perspective, the research presented in Chapters 4-6 attempts to examine work ethic 
and just-world beliefs from this system justification perspective.   
The Current Work 
In the following chapters I present a series of five studies aimed at advancement 
of the research on the work ethic and just-world beliefs by examining them from a 
motivated reasoning perspective.  Although research in the area of motivated reasoning is 
growing, work ethic and just-world beliefs have been relatively overlooked when it 
comes to research on these phenomena.  The current work attempts to address this issue 
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by utilizing a system justification (a type of motivated reasoning; Jost & Hunyady, 2002; 
Kay et al., 2008; Kay et al., 2009) perspective to guide predictions regarding the role of 
work ethic and just-world beliefs in victim blame, derogation and prejudice.   
The first study utilized this perspective to predict the role of work-ethic beliefs in 
reactions to a job applicant.  Specifically, I utilized a system justification perspective to 
form hypotheses regarding how work-ethic beliefs would influence the effects of 
applicant race and previous work experience on thoughts and impressions in response to 
the applicant.  Based on this perspective, as well as previous work demonstrating the link 
between work-ethic beliefs and attitudes towards disadvantaged groups, I predicted that 
when the applicant's work experience was inconsistent with requirements of the job (i.e., 
low quality resume), those low in endorsement of work-ethic beliefs would report more 
negative thoughts and impressions, regardless of the applicant's race.  However, among 
those participants who do strongly endorse work-ethic beliefs, I predicted that when 
resume quality was low, these participants would respond more negatively to the Black 
than the White applicant.  These predications are consistent with a system justification 
perspective in that when resume quality was low and the applicant was Black, those who 
strongly endorse work-ethic values were expected to use resume quality as a way to 
justify disadvantaged group status. Looking at it from another perspective, these 
participants would also be demonstrating favoritism towards the advantaged group (by 
responding more positively to the White applicant) even when the advantaged group 
member’s qualifications did not match the position.   
Studies 2 and 3 added to the first in several ways.  First, they were aimed at 
examining the potential role of just-world beliefs as another system-justifying ideology.  
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Second, these studies examined reactions to two additional typically disadvantaged 
groups: gay men and people living with HIV and AIDS.  Third, Study 3 examined the 
effect of a potentially conflicting motive with system justification.  Specifically, this 
study examined whether motivation to control prejudice may override the effects of 
system justification and just-world motives.  Finally, I examined these potential 
motivated reasoning effects within a new domain: healthcare.   
Both Studies 2 and 3 examined reactions to an HIV positive male applying for a 
free prescription drug coverage program.  Method of disease transmission (controllable 
vs. uncontrollable) and the sexual orientation of the applicant (heterosexual vs. gay) were 
manipulated, with the expectation that beliefs regarding whether sexual orientation is a 
choice would moderate the effects of method of disease transmission and the applicant’s 
sexual orientation.  Specifically, sexual orientation was not expected to influence 
reactions to the applicant among those who do not believe sexual orientation is a choice.  
Additionally, participants who believe that sexual orientation is a choice were expected to 
respond similarly to gay and heterosexual applicants when infection was controllable as 
there would be no threat to just world beliefs in this situation (i.e., no need to justify 
infection).  However, when infection was uncontrollable, it was expected that those who 
believe sexual orientation is a choice would use the applicant’s sexual orientation to 
justify responding more negatively to gay than heterosexual applicants.  In other words, 
when infection was uncontrollable and the applicant was gay, these participants would 
use the applicant’s sexual orientation to explain why infection occurred as a route to 
maintaining their just-world beliefs.  These results are consistent with a system 
justification perspective in that these participants were utilizing their beliefs that sexual 
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orientation is a choice as a way to justify responding more negatively to a disadvantaged 
group.  In other words, these beliefs allow these participants to justify the disadvantaged 
group status and the resulting treatment toward gay men.   
Studies 4 and 5 examined the effect of priming justice-related values on the role 
of just-world beliefs and system justification in reactions to an individual who had been 
laid off from their job.  Specifically, these studies examined the effects of individual 
differences in endorsement of just-world beliefs and activation of justice-related primes 
on victim blame (Studies 4 and 5) and derogation (Study 5) in response to an individual 
whose group identity is unknown (e.g., unknown race).  The justice primes were expected 
to enhance the system-justifying tendencies of those who strongly endorse just-world 
beliefs such that those exposed to the primes would be more likely to blame and derogate 
the victim in comparison to those not exposed to the justice-related primes. 
After presenting the five studies, the final chapter will briefly summarize the 
findings from this work and discuss how it helps in understanding the link between 
system justification and work ethic and just-world beliefs.  The final chapter will also 
include a discussion of how this work might guide future research and suggestions for 
future studies.   
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CHAPTER 4: WORK-ETHIC BELIEFS AND HIRING1 
As reviewed in Chapter 3, work-ethic beliefs include endorsement of the idea that 
whether one succeeds is due to their own hard work, rather that outside factors such as 
whether one is a member of a disadvantaged group (Atieh et al., 1987; Weber, 1930).  
Specifically, work-ethic beliefs are associated with endorsement of a variety of work 
related values, such as hard work, delaying gratification, and thrift (Atieh et al., 1987; 
Furnham, 1984; Weber, 1930).  Much of the early theorizing on work-ethic beliefs 
focused on the link between these beliefs and the development capitalism, with Weber 
(1930) proposing that work-ethic beliefs form the basis of capitalistic ideals.   
Research on work-ethic beliefs within psychology has primarily focused on the 
relationship between individual differences in endorsement of work-ethic beliefs and 
other individual difference level variables, such as conservatism and attitudes toward 
disadvantaged groups.  Particularly relevant to the work presented in this chapter, there 
has been a growing amount of research linking endorsement work-ethic beliefs and 
associated values to stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination towards Blacks (i.e., 
Biernat et al., 1996).  This work indicates that much of what might drive negative 
reactions towards various disadvantaged groups, such as Blacks, is the perception that 
they violate certain values, such as those typically associated with endorsement of work-
ethic beliefs (see Chapter 3 for a review).   
Although there has been considerable work looking at the effect of work-ethic 
beliefs and attitudes towards disadvantaged groups (Kinder & Sears, 1981; Levy, West, 
                                                 
1
 Edited version of: Murray, R. A., & Blankenship, K. L.(2014). The role of system 
justification and work-ethic beliefs in hiring decisions. Manuscript in preparation.  
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Ramirez, & Karafantis, 2006), as well as work showing relationships between work-ethic 
beliefs and other constructs (i.e., just-world beliefs and conservatism; Christopher et al., 
2008; Furnham & Rajamanickam, 1992; Ghorpade et al., 2006), there has been little 
discussion of what drives work-ethic beliefs.  As noted in Chapter 3, one exception to this 
is some of the work motivated reasoning.  Specifically, work on system justification 
theory has proposed that work-ethic beliefs are a form of system justifying ideology (Jost 
et al., 2004; Jost & Hunyady, 2005).  In other words, system justification theorists argue 
that endorsement of work-ethic beliefs is the result of the motive to justify the system.   
The Current Research 
In this chapter I present a study that attempts to expand upon the work examining 
the link between work-ethic beliefs and reactions to disadvantaged groups through the 
use of a motivated reasoning perspective.  Specifically, system justification theory was 
used predict the effect of work-ethic beliefs on reactions toward a disadvantaged group 
(i.e., Blacks) within a hiring paradigm.  As discussed in Chapter 3, I examined work-ethic 
beliefs as a potential moderator of the effects of previous work experience (consistent vs. 
inconsistent with the job position) and race (White vs. Black) on reactions to a job 
applicant.  Consistent with a motivated reasoning perspective, I predicted that those who 
strongly endorse work-ethic beliefs would be more likely to engage in system 
justification, resulting in more negative reactions toward Black applicants (disadvantaged 
group), and favorability bias toward White applicants.  When participants high in work-
ethic beliefs were presented with an applicant whose previous work experience did not 
match the job description, it was predicted that they would be motivated to use this 
information as an additional piece of evidence to justify disadvantaged group status, 
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resulting in more negative thoughts and impressions for the Black applicant.  In other 
words, these participants were expected to use the resume quality information as a way to 
justify their prejudiced responses, consistent with work linking endorsement of work-
ethic beliefs with prejudice towards disadvantaged groups (e.g., Katz & Hass, 1988; 
Biernat et al., 1996).  Additionally, it was expected that these participants would 
demonstrate favoritism toward the advantaged group such that a White applicant whose 
previous work experience did not match the job description would be judged similarly to 
those whose qualifications did match the job description, indicating a motive to overlook 
this flaw for members of advantaged groups, justifying group status.   
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: Main effect for resume quality.  Participants were expected to 
respond more negatively to job applicants whose resume quality was low (i.e., previous 
experience is inconsistent with the position) rather than high (i.e., previous experience 
consistent with the position) with the position.   
Hypothesis 2: Interaction between work-ethic beliefs and applicant race as a 
moderator of the effect of resume quality.  Among participants who do not strongly 
endorse work-ethic beliefs, the effect of resume quality was expected to be similar for 
both White and Black Applicants.  However, among participants who do strongly endorse 
work-ethic beliefs, when resume quality was low, they were expected to respond more 
negatively to Black rather than White applicants.   
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Method 
Participants 
Participants included one-hundred and two White undergraduate students at a 
large Mid-Western university who completed the study for course credit.  Eight 
participants failed the manipulation check and were not included in the analyses, 
resulting in a final sample of size ninety-four.  Fifty-one percent of the participants were 
female; ages ranged from 18 to 30 with a mean age of 20.   
Design and Procedure 
This study utilized a 2(Resume quality: low vs. high) x 2(Race: White vs. Black 
male) x Work-ethic beliefs (continuous) between subjects design.  Participants were 
brought into the lab and sat at a computer where all manipulations and measures were 
administered (study materials are presented in Appendix A).  At the beginning of the 
session, all participants completed a consent form that included a description of the study 
indicating that that the study’s purpose was to examine how various factors contribute in 
hiring decisions.  The study started with participants reviewing the resume of an 
individual they believed to be applying for an office manager position (low vs. high 
quality) as well as a short description of the job responsibilities.  Participants were then 
given 4 minutes to list their thoughts in response to the resume (see Wegener, Downing, 
Krosnick, & Petty, 1995, for more details on the thought listing task procedure) and then 
rated their perceptions of the quality of the resume.  Next, participants viewed a screen 
shot of the applicant’s Facebook page which included a picture of the applicant (White 
vs. Black) that served as the race manipulation.  A Facebook page was used to 
manipulate race as it has become common for employers to check social media when 
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researching potential employees.  As such, participants were informed that they would be 
viewing the Facebook page because it is now commonplace for employers to look up 
potential employees online in order to get an impression of potential employees that goes 
beyond the materials provided (i.e., resume). 
After reviewing the Facebook page, participants rated their thoughts from the 
earlier thought listing task as positive, negative, or neutral, reported their impressions of 
the applicant, and indicated whether they thought the applicant should be hired.  Finally, 
participants completed a measure of their work-ethic beliefs, several demographic 
questions, and were debriefed.   
Predictor Variables 
Resume quality.  Resume quality was manipulated such that in the high quality 
resume the applicant had previous management experience (vs. no management 
experience), a BA in Management (vs. an AA in Business Administration), a 3.73 GPA 
(vs. 3.23 GPA), and graduated with distinction (vs. no honors).  All other factors, 
including previous employers (all food industry) and dates of employment were the same 
across the two conditions.   
Applicant race.  The applicant’s race was manipulated by having participants 
view a screenshot of what they were told was the applicant’s Facebook page.  Everything 
on the Facebook page was identical between conditions except for the race of the male 
presented in the picture (White vs. Black).   
Work-ethic beliefs.  To measure endorsement of work-ethic beliefs, participants 
completed the eleven item Protestant Work Ethic scale (Katz & Haas, 1988; α = .75).  
The measure utilizes a 7-point Likert-type scale to indicate agreement with items such as 
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“People who fail at a job have usually not tried hard enough.” Higher scores indicate 
stronger endorsement.   
Dependent Variables 
 Thoughts.  Similar to previous work (i.e., Clark et al., 2009), participants rated 
the valence of the thoughts they reported in the thought listing task.  The thought listing 
task occurred in between reviewing the resume and viewing the Facebook page, and 
rating the thoughts occurred after viewing the Facebook page.  Participants rated their 
thoughts as positive, negative, or neutral/unrelated to the applicant.  Thought scores were 
calculated by subtracting negative thoughts from positive thoughts and then dividing by 
the total number of thoughts, resulting in thought scores that ranged from -1 to 1, with -1 
indicating all negative thoughts and 1 all positive thoughts (Wegener et al., 1995). 
Impressions.  After reviewing all the relevant application materials and rating 
their thoughts, participants completed three questions addressing general impressions of 
the applicant on 7-point Likert-type scales, with higher scores indicating more positive 
impressions (α = .90).   
Hiring recommendation.  Next, participants completed three questions regarding 
whether they believe the applicant is qualified for the job and if they would recommend 
hiring the applicant for the position (α = .90).  A 7-point Likert-type scale was utilized 
with higher scores indicating a greater belief that the applicant is qualified and should be 
hired.   
Demographics and manipulation check.  Participants also completed a number 
of demographic questions including their age, sex, race, and political identification, in 
order to examine potential demographic related differences.  As part of a manipulation 
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check, participants were asked what the race was of the applicant and were dropped from 
analysis if they were incorrect (n = 8).  Additionally, between reviewing the resume and 
viewing the Facebook page, participants completed two questions assessing their 
perceptions of the quality of the resume to ensure that the resume quality manipulation 
functioned as intended.  The questions utilized a 7-point Likert-type scale with higher 
scores indicating higher perceived resume quality.  The manipulation functioned as 
expected, with participants rating the resume with qualifications that were consistent with 
the position they were applying for as higher in quality (M = 7.0, SD = 1.6) and as better 
in comparison to the average resume (M = 5.3, SD = 1.4), t(92) = -5.62, p <.01.   
Results 
 Multiple regression was utilized to test the effects of the 2(Resume quality: Low 
vs. High) x 2(Race: White vs. Black male) x Work-Ethic Beliefs (continuous) between 
subjects design on participant’s thoughts, impressions, and hiring recommendations.  All 
interactions were examined using the procedures outlined by Aiken and West (1991).  
Independent variables were centered prior to running the regression analyses, however, 
all means and standard deviations are presented in their original form for ease of 
interpretation.  The overall fit for the models predicting thought positivity [R2 = .26, F(7, 
85) = 4.4, p < .01], impressions [R2 = .20, F(7, 86) = 3.0, p < .01], and hiring 
recommendations [R2 = .36, F(7, 86) = 6.97, p < .01] were all significant, indicating that 
it was appropriate to examine main effects and interactions.   
The first hypothesis was that there would be a main effect for resume quality, 
such that participants would respond more positively to applicants when their previous 
experience was consistent with the position they were applying for.  As expected, a 
significant main effect for resume quality was found on thoughts, [b = .25, t(85) = 4.36, p 
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< .01, sr2 = .16], impressions [b = 1.08, t(86) = 3.59, p < .01, sr2 = .12], and support for 
hiring [b = 2.08, t(86) = 6.29, p < .01, sr2 = .29].  Specifically, when the applicant’s 
experience was consistent with the position they were applying for (i.e., high quality) 
participants reported more positive thoughts and impressions, and were more likely to 
recommend hiring than when the applicants previous experience was inconsistent (i.e., 
low quality) with the position (see Table 1 for means and standard deviations).   
Work-Ethic Beliefs as a Moderator.  The second hypothesis was that work-ethic 
beliefs would moderate the effects of resume quality and applicant race on participant’s 
thoughts, impressions, and support for hiring.  Consistent with this hypothesis, there were 
significant three-way interactions between resume quality, applicant race, and work-ethic 
beliefs on both thoughts [b = .02, t(85) = 2.26, p < .05, sr2 = .04] and impressions [b = 
.09, t(86) = 2.16, p < .05, sr2 = .04] (see Figures 1 & 2).  Additionally, there was a 
marginally significant three-way interaction between resume quality, applicant race, and 
work-ethic beliefs on support for hiring [b = .08, t(86) = 1.89, p = .06, sr2 = .03] (see 
Figure 3). 
 To examine the three-way interactions I tested the effects of resume quality and 
race separately for participants whose endorsement of work-ethic beliefs were one 
standard deviation below and one standard deviation above the mean (M = 49.6, SD = 
8.4).  Among those low in endorsement of work-ethic beliefs, only a main effect of 
resume quality occurred, such that more positive thoughts [b = .25, t(85) = 2.77, p < .01] 
and impressions [b = 1.09, t(86) = 2.53, p < .01] resulted from the high, rather than low, 
quality resume (see Table 2 for means and standard deviations).  However, among those 
are high in endorsement of work-ethic beliefs there was a significant effect of applicant 
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race on both thoughts [b = -.30, t(85) = -2.63, p < .01] and impressions [b = -1.16, t(86) = 
-1.97, p < .05] when resume quality was low, such that thoughts and impressions were 
more negative when the applicant was Black, rather than White (see Figures 1 and 2; see 
Table 3 for means and standard deviations).  Race of applicant did not influence thoughts 
[b = .15, t(85) = 1.27, p = .21] or impressions [b = .36, t(86) = .58, p = .56] when the 
applicants previous experience was consistent with the position (i.e., high quality 
resume).  In other words, when resume quality was high, race did not influence reactions 
to the applicant.  However, when resume quality was low, race did influence reactions 
such that these participants reported more negative thoughts and impression in response 
to the Black (vs. White) applicant.   
As noted earlier, there was also a marginally significant 3-way interaction 
between applicant race, resume quality, and work-ethic beliefs on hiring 
recommendations.  Again, I tested the effects of resume quality and applicant race 
separately for those low and high in endorsement of work-ethic beliefs.  However, with 
support for hiring the effects were reversed.  Among those high in endorsement of work-
ethic beliefs, only a main effect of resume quality was found [b = 1.80, t(86) = 3.56, p < 
.01], such that these participants were more likely to support hiring when resume quality 
was high rather than low (see Table 4 for means and standard deviations).  In other 
words, race did not influence support for hiring among those high in endorsement of 
work-ethic beliefs (i.e., the Resume quality x Race interaction was non-significant; b = 
0.28, t(86) = 0.55, p = .58).  However, among those low in endorsement of work-ethic 
beliefs, when resume quality was low there was a significant effect of applicant race [b = 
1.93, t(86) = 2.65, p <.01] such that these participants reported greater support for hiring 
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when the applicant was Black rather than White (see Figure 3; see Table 5 for means and 
standard deviations).  In other words, when resume quality was low, participants who do 
not endorse work ethic beliefs were more likely to support hiring for the Black than the 
White applicant.  Possible explanations for these results will be discussed.   
In sum, overall participants responded more positively to the applicant whose 
qualifications were consistent with position they were applying for (i.e., high quality 
resume) than when their qualifications were inconsistent (i.e., low quality resume) with 
the position.  However, among participants who strongly endorse work-ethic beliefs, 
when resume quality was low they reported more negative thoughts and impressions 
when the applicant was Black rather than White.  In other words, these participants 
appear to have used the Black applicants low quality resume to justify these more 
negative thoughts and impressions.  These results are consistent with work linking 
endorsement of work-ethic beliefs with both endorsement of negative stereotypes and 
prejudice towards disadvantaged groups, including Blacks.  However, these effects were 
somewhat reversed when it came to support for hiring, with the Resume quality x Race 
interaction occurring for those low, rather than high, in endorsement of work-ethic 
beliefs.  As will be discussed, the effect of the interaction was also opposite for these 
participants, such that when resume quality was low, participants who are low in 
endorsement of work-ethic beliefs responded more positively to the Black, rather than 
White, applicant. 
Discussion 
As reviewed at the beginning of this chapter and in Chapter 3, endorsement of 
work-ethic beliefs is associated with the belief that success is due to how hard a person 
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works, rather than other factors outside of one's control (e.g., racism; Biernat, et al., 1996; 
Katz & Hass, 1988).  Research on endorsement work-ethic beliefs has demonstrated that 
those who strongly endorse work-ethic beliefs tend to be more conservative (Christopher 
et al., 2008; Furnham & Bland, 1983) and are more likely to engage in stereotyping and 
prejudice (Biernat et al., 1996; Katz & Hass, 1988; Malcomnson et al., 2006).  However, 
little work has examined what drives endorsement work-ethic beliefs.  The primary goal 
of the first study was to help address the question of what drives endorsement of work-
ethic beliefs by utilizing a motivated reasoning (system justification) perspective.  
Specifically, this perspective was used to help understand the effects of endorsement of 
work-ethic beliefs on reactions toward disadvantaged groups (i.e., Blacks). 
 As expected, there was a main effect for resume quality such that participants 
responded more positively (more positive thoughts, impressions, and greater support for 
hiring) when resume quality was high (i.e., consistent with the position they were 
applying for).  This effect was qualified by a three-way interaction between resume 
quality, race of the applicant, and endorsement of work-ethic beliefs.  Endorsement of 
work-ethic beliefs qualified the effects of resume quality and race such that there was a 
significant resume quality by race interaction among those who strongly endorse work-
ethic beliefs, but not among those who do not endorse work-ethic beliefs.  Specifically, 
those who strongly endorse work-ethic beliefs reported more negative thoughts and 
impressions when the applicant was Black rather than White.   
These results are consistent with what was expected from a motivated 
reasoning/system justification perspective.  Specifically, based on system justification 
theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994) and research suggesting that endorsement of work-ethic 
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beliefs is a form of system justification (Jost & Hunyady, 2005), it was expected that 
those who strongly endorse work-ethic beliefs would be more likely to engage in system 
justification by responding more negatively to the Black (rather than White) applicant 
when their resume was inconsistent with the job position.  These participants appear to be 
using resume quality to justify disadvantaged group’s status as well as their own 
prejudice.  In other words, by responding to the Black applicant more negatively, they 
support the current system in which members of certain groups, in this case Blacks, are 
treated differently simply based on their group status.   
Interestingly, when it came to hiring recommendations I found somewhat 
opposite effects.  Participants low in endorsement of work-ethic beliefs were more likely 
to recommend hiring when the applicant was Black rather than White when resume 
quality was low, and participants high in endorsement of work-ethic beliefs responded 
showed no difference in their hiring recommendations across applicant race.  One 
possible explanation for these results is that there may be a competing motive in play.  In 
other words, it is possible that some other factor is motivating participants to report 
greater support for hiring for the Black (vs. White) applicant relative to their thoughts and 
impressions.  For example, participants low in endorsement of work-ethic beliefs may be 
responding more positively to the Black applicant because of their beliefs that hard work 
does not always lead to positive outcomes (i.e., their awareness that the system is not 
just), and in turn they are adjusting their support for hiring accordingly.  On the other 
hand, participants high in work-ethic beliefs may be experiencing an alternative motive, 
such as the motivation to avoid prejudice, resulting in them responding equally to Black 
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and White applicants when resume quality is low, even though their thoughts and 
impressions were more negative for the Black applicant.   
This study represents an important first step in examining the role of motivated 
reasoning (e.g., system justification) in response to members of disadvantaged groups.  
Consistent with my system justification derived hypothesis, when resume quality was low 
participants who strongly endorse work-ethic beliefs were able to use the applicants low 
quality resume to justify more negative thoughts and impressions towards the 
disadvantaged group member (Black applicant), while responding positively to the 
advantaged group member (White applicant).  Although this only applied to thoughts and 
impressions, it is possible that competing motives were at play which prevented these 
participants’ thoughts and impressions from influencing hiring recommendations as 
expected.  Study 3 attempts to address this possibility through work examining reactions 
to additional disadvantaged groups: gay men and people living with HIV/AIDS.   
Studies 2 and 3 utilize this same motivated reasoning (system justification) 
framework to examine the effect of just-world beliefs in response to an HIV positive 
male applying for a free prescription drug coverage program.  Both the method of disease 
transmission (controllable vs. uncontrollable) and the sexual orientation of the applicant 
(heterosexual vs. gay) were manipulated through a vignette describing the applicant.  
Utilizing system justification and just world theories, it was predicted that the effects of 
method of disease transmission and the applicant’s sexual orientation would be 
moderated by participants beliefs regarding whether sexual orientation is a choice.  
Specifically, it was expected that when infection was uncontrollable, participants who 
believe orientation is a choice would respond more negatively to gay (rather than 
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heterosexual) applicants.  In other words, when infection was uncontrollable it was 
expected that participants would search for a reason to explain why infection occurred 
(just-world theory), and those who believe that sexual orientation is a choice would 
utilize the applicants sexual orientation (when the applicant was gay) to justify infection.  
These results are also consistent with the perspective that just-world beliefs are a form of 
system justification, in that through justifying infection through the applicant’s sexual 
orientation, participants are able to justify disadvantaged group status for gay men.   
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Figure 1. Interaction between Resume Quality and Applicant Race on Thoughts among 
Participants High in Endorsement of Work-Ethic Beliefs 
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Figure 2. Interaction between Resume Quality and Applicant Race on Impressions 
among Participants High in Endorsement of Work-Ethic Beliefs 
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Figure 3. Interaction between Resume Quality and Applicant Race on Support for Hiring 
among Participants Low in Endorsement of Work-Ethic Beliefs 
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Table 1 
Means and Standard Deviations for Study 1 Variables by Resume Quality 
 
Low Quality High Quality 
Variable M   SD M SD 
Thoughts* -0.01 0.6 0.5 0.5 
Impressions* 13.8 3.1 15.9 2.9 
Support for Hiring* 12.0 3.6 16.0 3.0 
Note: * p < .05 
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Table 2 
Means and Standard Deviations for Study 1 Variables by Resume Quality for 
Participants Low in Endorsement of Work-Ethic Beliefs 
 
Low Quality High Quality 
Variable M   SD M SD 
Thoughts* -0.3 0.6 0.4 0.5 
Impressions* 12.7 3.9 16.1 3.1 
Support for Hiring* 10.0 3.7 16.0 2.1 
Note: * p < .05 
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Table 3 
Means and Standard Deviations for Study 1 Variables by Applicant Race for Participants 
High in Endorsement of Work-Ethic Beliefs when Resume Quality was Low 
 
White Applicant Black Applicant 
Variable M   SD M SD 
Thoughts* 0.5 0.5 -0.3 0.9 
Impressions* 15.3 1.5 10.0 1.4 
Support for Hiring 11.0 5.6 11.0 4.2 
Note: * p < .05 
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Table 4 
Means and Standard Deviations for Study 1 Variables by Resume Quality for 
Participants High in Endorsement of Work-Ethic Beliefs 
 
Low Quality High Quality 
Variable M   SD M SD 
Thoughts*   0.2 0.8   0.6 0.4 
Impressions* 13.2 3.2 16.3 2.8 
Support for Hiring* 11.0 4.5 16.2 3.7 
Note: * p < .05
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Table 5 
Means and Standard Deviations for Study 1 Variables by Applicant Race for Participants 
Low in Endorsement of Work-Ethic Beliefs when Resume Quality was Low 
 
White Applicant Black Applicant 
Variable M   SD M SD 
Thoughts -0.2 0.3 -0.4 0.8 
Impressions 12.3 5.7 13.0 2.9 
Support for Hiring*  8.0 3.6 11.5 3.3 
Note: * p < .05 
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CHAPTER 5: JUST-WORLD BELIEFS AND ATTITUDES TOWARD PEOPLE 
LIVING WITH HIV/AIDS2 
HIV/AIDS is a stigmatizing health condition whose victims face a range of 
negative reactions including avoidance, discrimination, and violence (Gostin, 1990; 
Herek, 1999; Neumann, Hulsenbeck, & Seibt, 2004).  Reactions to individuals with 
HIV/AIDS are not only reflections of the severity of the disease or risk of transmission, 
but also due to the associations of HIV/AIDS with homosexuality and drug use (e.g., 
Herek & Capitanio, 1999a; Valdiserri, 2002).  In fact, the first known cases of HIV 
infection in the United States occurred in the 1980’s with the media commonly calling it 
a “gay disease” (Herek & Capitanio, 1999a).  Even as the public learned that HIV could 
infect anyone exposed to infected blood, many still blame the gay community for the 
spread of the disease (Herek & Capitanio, 1999b).  The present research utilizes a 
motivated reasoning (system justification) perspective and just world theory to explore 
how the stigmas associated with being HIV positive influences how individuals react to 
people living with HIV/AIDS.   
 Because of the intense stigma faced by people living with HIV/AIDS, an 
important question is how this stigma influences the healthcare that people living with 
HIV/AIDS receive.  Unfortunately, patients who feel stigmatized are less likely to reveal 
their HIV status to others, including health professionals (Rintamaki, Davis, 
Skripkauskas, Bennett, & Wolf, 2006; Vanable, Carey, Blair, & Littlewood, 2006).  
Those who reveal their HIV status often feel stigmatized and discriminated against by 
                                                 
2
 Edited version of Murray, R. A., Aberson, C. L., Blankenship, K. L., & Barry Highfield, 
J. J. (2013). Beliefs that sexual orientation is a choice and motivation to control prejudice 
moderates method of disease transmission and sexual  orientation effects on reactions to 
HIV positive men. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 35, 272-285.  
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health professionals (Schuster et al., 2005; Tyer-Viola, 2007).  In fact, some health care 
providers openly admit intentions to refuse health care to those infected with HIV.  For 
example, one study found that roughly half of nurse practitioners and obstetricians, as 
well as a quarter of plastic surgeons reported that they would refuse HIV-positive patients 
(Sears & Ho, 2006).   
As reviewed in Chapter 3, just world theory proposes that due to the motivation to 
maintain just-world beliefs, when people cannot attribute a negative outcome to a specific 
undesirable behavior, they instead try to find an undesirable characteristic of the 
individual that could justify his/her negative experience.  Because of its ability to help in 
understanding reactions to people in situations where there is no clear link between a 
persons’ behavior and the negative event experienced, just world theory appears to be 
particularly useful when considering responses to people living with HIV/AIDS, 
especially when cause of infection is either unknown or uncontrollable.  Specifically, it 
was expected that when making judgments about an individual infected with HIV when 
there is no specific negatively viewed behavior associated with infection (e.g., unsafe 
sex), people would likely look for a supposed character flaw or stigma associated with 
the person (e.g., homosexuality) to explain why he/she became infected.  By looking for 
an alternative reason to explain negative events that occurred outside of another’s control, 
it is possible to maintain just-world beliefs and at the same time justify the system.   
It is important to keep in mind, however, that people feel the need to believe that 
their conclusions are rational, despite evidence that their decisions are often driven by 
self-serving biases (Kunda, 1990; Kunda & Sinclair, 1999).  That is, an individual’s 
motives play a significant role in how information is processed.  This perspective may 
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help us understand how the need to believe in a just world influences reactions to people 
living with HIV/AIDS.  First, it was predicted that the need to believe in a just world 
influences reactions to people living with HIV/AIDS such that when infection was 
controllable (e.g., occurring through unsafe sex), people would attribute infection to a 
specific negatively viewed behavior.  This attribution drives negative responses to both 
gay and heterosexual targets.  However, when infection was uncontrollable (e.g., 
occurring through blood transfusion), participants cannot simply attribute infection to the 
victim’s negative behavior.  In order to preserve just-world beliefs they look for an 
alternative reason, such as a supposed character flaw, to explain why this negative event 
(HIV infection) occurred.  When evaluating a heterosexual target whose infection was 
uncontrollable, it may not be possible to generate a rational explanation for why infection 
occurred, which may result in more favorable responses to heterosexual targets.  In 
contrast, when evaluating gay targets, people may use the stigma associated with 
homosexuality to justify why infection occurred, allowing them to maintain their just 
world beliefs.   
These predictions are also consistent with a system justification perspective.  In 
fact, system justification theorists have proposed that just-world beliefs are a form of 
system justification based on the idea that through maintenance of just-world beliefs one 
is able to reason that any disparities between groups is due to actual differences between 
groups, rather than un-just causes such as prejudice (Jost et al., 2003a; Jost & Hunyady, 
2005).  In this case, when infection was uncontrollable and the applicant is gay, using the 
applicant's sexual orientation to explain how infection occurred helps to justify the 
system in which gay men are a disadvantaged group.   
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Effects of Perceptions of Control on Attitudes toward People Living with HIV/AIDS  
Several studies have explored the role of onset controllability in attitudes toward 
people living with HIV/AIDS.  In general, when onset was controllable (e.g., infection 
occurring through unsafe sex or drug use), participants viewed the target less favorably 
than when onset was uncontrollable (Cobb & De Chabert, 2002; Herek & Capitanio, 
1999b; Senior, Weinman, & Marteau, 2002).  Although several studies have examined 
controllability effects, relatively few have examined whether sexual orientation 
moderates onset controllability effects.  In other words, are controllability effects are the 
same for evaluations of gay and heterosexual men?  One study examining the role of 
onset controllability in attitudes toward people living with HIV/AIDS found that 
participants responded more negatively to gay, rather than heterosexual, men when 
infection occurred through unprotected sex (i.e., controllable; Dooley, 1995).   However, 
in another study where method of disease transmission was manipulated (blood 
transfusion vs. unsafe sex), participants only responded more negatively to gay men when 
infection was uncontrollable (i.e., blood transfusion; Seacat et al., 2007).  One of the 
goals of the current work is use a motivated reasoning perspective to help clarify the 
effects of onset controllability and sexual orientation in response to people living with 
HIV/AIDS.   
Perceptions of Choice and Attitudes toward Gay Men 
 Although previous research has attempted to address how controllability of 
disease transmission affects reactions to people living with HIV/AIDS, to my knowledge, 
there is presently no research that addresses how beliefs regarding whether sexual 
orientation is a choice (i.e., controllable vs. uncontrollable) influences these reactions.  
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Whether sexual orientation is a choice remains widely debated.  Some individuals assert 
that sexual orientation is a choice and is immoral whereas others argue that sexual 
orientation is either genetic or formed early in childhood (Herek, 2002).  Individuals who 
believe sexual orientation is a choice tend to endorse more prejudiced attitudes toward 
gay men and lesbians than those who believe orientation is not a choice (Haslam & Levy, 
2006; Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2002; Jayaratne et al., 2006).   
The Current Research 
The primary goal of the present research was to utilize a motivated reasoning 
(system justification) perspective to help understand the effects of sexual orientation and 
method of disease transmission in reactions to people living with HIV/AIDS.  
Specifically, Studies 2 and 3 examined the effects of applicant sexual orientation (gay vs. 
heterosexual), method of disease transmission (controllable vs. uncontrollable), and 
participant's beliefs regarding whether sexual orientation is a choice in response to people 
living with HIV/AIDS applying for a free prescription drug coverage program.   
Given the relationship between perceptions of choice and prejudice towards gay 
men and lesbians, as well as the association between gay men and HIV infection, it was 
hypothesized that when participants cannot blame infection on a specific behavior, those 
who believe sexual orientation is a choice would place greater blame and responsibility 
on gay men infected with HIV than heterosexual men.  However, when infection can be 
attributed to the target’s behavior (e.g., unsafe sex), it was predicted that participants 
would have more negative reactions to those targets than when infection was 
uncontrollable (e.g., blood transfusion), regardless of applicant sexual orientation.  
Consistent with both a just world theory and system justification perspective, when 
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infection was uncontrollable (e.g., occurring through blood transfusion), participants 
would be unable to form judgments based on the target’s behavior and were expected to 
instead search for a supposed character flaw to explain why the target became infected.  
Specifically, it was expected that when the target is a gay man, participants who believe 
orientation is a choice will focus on the target’s sexual orientation to explain infection, 
consistent with predictions from just world theory, and will in turn react more negatively 
to gay than heterosexual targets.  Using sexual orientation to explain infection also helps 
to justify continued disadvantaged group status for gay men, consistent with a system 
justification perspective.   
In other words, it was predicted that an individual’s perceptions of homosexuality 
would moderate the interaction between applicant sexual orientation and method of 
disease transmission.  When infection was uncontrollable, it was expected that 
individuals who believe sexual orientation as a choice would be more likely to use 
homosexuality to rationalize negative outcomes.  For those who do not believe 
orientation is a choice, it would be difficult to rationalize blaming someone for their HIV 
infection solely based on their sexual orientation when they believe that sexual 
orientation is uncontrollable.   
As will be discussed in detail, Study 3 also explored whether a motivated 
reasoning-type variable, in this case motivation to control prejudice, could serve as an 
additional moderator of the proposed sexual orientation by controllability by choice 
interaction.  It was expected that only those who believe sexual orientation is a choice 
and who are also low in motivation to control prejudice would respond more negatively 
to gay than heterosexual targets when infection was controllable.   
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Study 2 Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: Main effect for method of disease transmission.  Participants 
would respond more negatively to targets when their HIV infection was controllable than 
when it was uncontrollable. 
Hypothesis 2: Perceptions of choice as a moderator.  When infection was 
controllable, these participants would respond negatively to both gay and heterosexual 
men.  However, when infection was uncontrollable, participants who believe sexual 
orientation is a choice would respond more negatively to gay than heterosexual men.   
Study 2 
Participants 
Three-hundred and forty-three heterosexual participants completed the study.  
Participants were either students at a public university in the Western United States (n = 
99) or part of a convenience sample recruited online (n = 256; note that all participants 
completed the study online).3  Eighty-eight participants failed one or both of the 
manipulation checks and were not included in the analyses.4  The final sample included 
267 participants, 79 from the university and 188 recruited online.  None of the 
participants in the final sample indicated that they were HIV positive or had AIDS.  The 
majority of participants were students (62.2%); seventy-five percent were female, and 
ages ranged from 18 to 66 with a mean age of 29.   
                                                 
3
 No significant differences existed between students and non-students, and only attitudes 
toward gay men differed (t (250) = -2.14, p = .034, d = 0.30) between the participation 
pool and the internet sample, with internet sample expressing more negative attitudes 
toward gay men. Because of the similarity across samples, collapsing was determined to 
be appropriate. 
4
 Including participants in the analyses who failed the manipulation check yielded non-
significant results. 
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Design and Procedure 
 The present study utilized a 2(Sexual orientation: heterosexual vs. gay) X 
2(Method of disease transmission: controllable vs. uncontrollable) X 2(Orientation as a 
choice: true vs. false) between subjects design.  After reading a description of the study 
and indicating their consent to participate, participants were told that they would be 
reading about a person applying for a health care program and that their opinions were 
wanted regarding whether the person should be admitted to the program (see Appendix B 
for study materials).  Next, they read a vignette depicting an HIV positive man named 
Mike applying to a free prescription drug coverage program for people with HIV/AIDS.  
The vignette indicated the age (25), sex (male), sexual orientation of the applicant 
(heterosexual vs. gay) as well as how he became infected (unsafe sex vs. exposure to 
infected medical equipment).  It also stated that the program has very limited funding and 
cannot accept everyone who applies.  The content of the vignettes served to manipulate 
both sexual orientation and method of disease transmission, with each participant 
randomly assigned to one of the four vignettes.  After reading the vignette, participants 
completed measures of support for admittance to the prescription drug coverage program 
and attitudes towards gay men.  Finally, participants reported whether they believe sexual 
orientation is a choice and completed a brief demographic questionnaire.5  
Predictor Variables 
Sexual orientation.  Participants were randomly assigned to read a vignette that 
described the applicant as either a heterosexual or a gay man.   
                                                 
5
 No significant gender effects on study outcomes (all F’s < 2.62, p’s > .10).   
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Method of disease transmission.  Method of disease transmission was also 
manipulated in the vignette such that infection was described as occurring through either 
unsafe sex (i.e., controllable condition) or through exposure to infected medical 
equipment while working in a hospital (i.e., uncontrollable condition).   
Orientation as a choice.  Participants indicated whether they believe sexual 
orientation is a choice by answering either “True” or “False” to the statement “Sexual 
orientation is a choice.”  Only seventy-three participants responded that sexual 
orientation is a choice, a limitation that is addressed in the discussion.  To ensure that the 
manipulations did not influence participants’ reports of whether sexual orientation is a 
choice, a factorial logistic regression with applicant sexual orientation and method of 
disease transmission was utilized to predict responses to whether sexual orientation is a 
choice.  All effects were non-significant (p’s > .28), indicating that the manipulations had 
no effect on participants’ reports of sexual orientation as a choice.   
Additional Predictor 
Attitudes toward gay men.  Participants also completed the 10-item attitudes 
towards gay men scale (ATG; Herek, 1984).  While not a primary variable of interest, it 
was included to address the possibility that attitudes towards gay men, rather than beliefs 
regarding whether sexual orientation is a choice, would moderate the orientation and 
transmission effects (see Hegarty & Golden, 2008, and Moreno & Bodenhausen, 2001).  
Responses were recorded using a 5-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = 
strongly agree), with higher scores indicating more negative attitudes toward gay men (α 
= .94).   
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Dependent Variables 
Support for admittance to the drug coverage program.  After reading the 
vignette, participants responded to three questions where they reported their support for 
admitting the person described in the vignette to the prescription drug coverage program.  
Items were answered using a 5-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = 
strongly agree), with higher scores indicating greater support for admittance (α = .69). 
Manipulation checks.  At the end of the study, two questions addressed whether 
participants experienced the manipulations in the vignettes as intended.  The first 
question asked the participant to recall the sexual orientation of the person portrayed in 
the vignette, with options to select heterosexual, gay, bisexual, or unsure.  The second 
question asked them to recall how infection occurred, with the option to select unsafe sex, 
exposure to infected medical equipment, or unsure.   
Results 
A 2(Sexual orientation: heterosexual vs. gay) x 2(Method of disease transmission: 
controllable vs. uncontrollable) x 2(Orientation as a choice: true vs. false) between 
subjects Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) tested the hypothesis that among participants 
who believe orientation is a choice, when infection was uncontrollable reactions would 
be more negative when the applicant was gay rather than heterosexual.  Prior to analyses, 
the support for admittance variable was subjected to a reflected square root 
transformation to correct for negative skew.  All means and standard deviations reported 
are from the untransformed variable for ease of interpretation.  The overall fit of the 
model predicting support for admittance to the prescription drug coverage program was 
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significant, F(1,259) = 3.68, p < .01, η2 = .09, indicating that it was appropriate to 
examine main effects and interactions.   
 Based on predictions derived from just world theory, the first hypothesis was that 
participants would respond more negatively when infection was controllable (e.g., unsafe 
sex) than when infection was uncontrollable (e.g., exposure to infected medical 
equipment).  Consistent with this hypothesis, there was a main effect for transmission, 
F(1,259) = 13.87, p < .01, η2 = .05, reflecting that participants were less likely to support 
admittance when infection was controllable (M = 11.0, SD = 2.4) rather than 
uncontrollable (M = 12.2, SD = 2.3).   
Perceptions of choice as a moderator.  The second hypothesis predicted that 
when infection occurred through exposure to infected medical equipment, participants 
who see sexual orientation as a choice would express more negative reactions to gay than 
heterosexual applicants.  Consistent with this hypothesis, there was a significant three-
way interaction on the support for admittance variable, F(1, 259) = 5.46, p = .02, η2 = 
.02. 
To investigate the three-way interaction contrast effects within ANOVA were 
utilized to explore the effects of transmission and applicant sexual orientation separately 
for participants who do and do not believe that sexual orientation is a choice.  First,  there 
was a simple main effect for method of disease transmission demonstrating that method 
of disease transmission influenced reactions both for participants who believe sexual 
orientation is a choice, t(259) = 2.01, p = .049, d = 0.33, and for those who do not, t(259) 
= 3.91, p < .001, d = 0.57, consistent with Hypothesis 1.  Both groups reported greater 
support for admittance when infection occurred due to exposure to infected medical 
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equipment (M = 11.8, SD = 2.3; M = 12.3, SD = 2.3, respectively) than when infection 
occurred through unsafe sex (M = 11.0, SD = 2.6; M = 11.0, SD = 2.3, respectively).  No 
other main effects were significant (all F’s < 2.60, p’s >.10).   
Next, I examined the interaction between transmission and applicant sexual 
orientation separately for participants who do and do not believe orientation is a choice.  
As predicted, the interaction between transmission and applicant sexual orientation was 
non-significant, t(259) = 0.50, p = .48, d = 0.0, among those who do not believe 
orientation is a choice, indicating that sexual orientation of the applicant does not 
influence their support for admittance.  However, among participants who do believe that 
sexual orientation is a choice, when infection was uncontrollable these participants 
reported less support for admittance when the applicant was gay rather than heterosexual, 
t(259) = -2.42, p = .02, d = 0.92.  (sexual orientation did not influence support for 
admittance when infection was controllable; t(259) = 0.79, p = .43, d = 0.23).  In other 
words, among participants who believe that orientation is a choice, it appears that when 
infection was uncontrollable and the applicant was gay, these participants use the 
applicant’s sexual orientation to justify infection.   
Attitudes toward gay men.  Finally, an additional set of analyses was conducted 
to examine the possibility that attitudes towards gay men, rather than perceptions 
regarding orientation as a choice, would moderate the effects of orientation and method 
of disease transmission.  If this were the case, it would expected that adding attitudes 
toward gay men to the model would result in a significant three-way interaction between 
orientation, method of disease transmission, and attitudes toward gay men, and that the 
original three-way interaction with perceptions regarding orientation as a choice would 
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drop to non-significance.  Because attitudes towards gay men are measured using a 
continuous scale this model was tested using multiple regression.  Within this model the 
three-way interaction between applicant orientation, method of disease transmission and 
attitudes toward gay men was non-significant [b = -.008, t(255) = -1.18, p = .236].  
Additionally, the three-way interaction between applicant orientation, method of disease 
transmission, and perceptions regarding orientation as a choice remained significant [b = 
-.20, t(255) = -2.64, p < .01], supporting the original hypothesis.   
Discussion 
These findings are consistent with both a just world and system justification 
perspective.  First, method of disease transmission influenced support for admittance for 
both participants who do and do not believe sexual orientation is a choice.  This is 
consistent with just world theory, such that when an individual can attribute a negative 
event (e.g., becoming HIV positive) to a negatively viewed behavior (e.g., unsafe sex) 
that people will respond more harshly towards them.  Additionally, when the event 
cannot be attributed to a negative behavior, just world theory predicts that people will 
search for an alternative reason to explain the outcome, such as a supposed character flaw 
(e.g., homosexuality).  However, people also feel the need for their explanations to seem 
rational (Kunda, 1990; Kunda & Sinclair, 1999).  Consistent with this hypothesis, only 
participants who believe orientation is a choice were less likely to support admittance for 
gay than heterosexual applicants, indicating that when the applicant was gay these 
participants used the applicant’s sexual orientation to explain infection when they were 
unable to attribute infection directly to behaviors of the applicant.  For participants who 
believe sexual orientation is a choice, attributing infection to the applicant's sexual 
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orientation helps maintain their just-world beliefs.  Additionally, by attributing infection 
to the applicant's sexual orientation these participants justify the system in which gay 
men are a treated as a disadvantaged group. 
While the results of Study 2 are promising, one possible limitation was the large 
number of participants who failed the manipulation checks.  Although this is a concern, it 
is important to note that in the manipulation checks the participants were given several 
possible responses (e.g., in response to the targets sexual orientation they could choose 
heterosexual, gay, bisexual, or unsure) and thus only a small portion of participants who 
completed the study were likely to have passed by chance.  To address the high 
manipulation check failures and ensure that participants were reading the vignettes 
carefully, in Study 3 participants were informed that they would be asked about the 
vignette later in the study.  Additional detail was also added to the vignettes, including 
making it more explicit whether infection was controllable.   
A second potential limitation is the low number of participants (n = 73) who 
reported that they believe that sexual orientation is a choice.  Because participants were 
required to respond either “true” or “false” to whether they believe sexual orientation is a 
choice, it is possible that some variability in the construct was left unmeasured (see 
Haslam & Levy, 2006).  To address these issues, Study 3 used a continuous rather than 
categorical response scale and changed the measure to include multiple questions 
addressing participants’ thoughts regarding sexual orientation as a choice.  These changes 
should capture variability in the construct more accurately and including multiple items 
will allow for assessing reliability.   
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Additionally, when infection was uncontrollable, the present study described 
infection as having occurred through exposure to infected medical equipment, whereas 
previous work has described uncontrollable infections as occurring through blood 
transfusion (e.g., Seacat et al., 2007).  Although both are low in likelihood, transmission 
through blood transfusion may be a more salient manipulation as participants likely 
understand what a blood transfusion is but may have difficulty conceptualizing how 
exposure would occur through infected medical equipment.  In Study 3, the vignettes 
were changed to depict uncontrollable infection as occurring through blood transfusion 
rather than exposure to infected medical equipment.   
Study 3 
 Study 3 had two primary goals.  The first was to replicate the findings from Study 
2 while attempting to address some potential limitations of that study (i.e., manipulation 
check failures).  Specifically, in Study 3, a continuous (rather than categorical) measure 
of participants’ beliefs regarding sexual orientation as a choice was utilized with the 
expectation that this would more accurately capture variability in the construct.  In an 
attempt to address the high manipulation check failures found in Study 2, additional 
detail to the vignettes was added and participants were informed that they would be asked 
questions about the vignettes later in the study.  Additionally, the vignettes were changed 
such that infection occurred through blood transfusion rather than through infected 
medical equipment in the uncontrollable infection condition, consistent with previous 
work (e.g., Seacat et al., 2007).   
The second goal was to explore motivation to control prejudice as a potential 
moderator of the effects found in Study 2.  Specifically, it was predicted that motivation 
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to control prejudice may serve as a competing motive that would override the motives to 
system justify and maintain just-world beliefs.  If one is strongly motivated to control 
prejudice, they may avoid using the applicant's sexual orientation to justify infection, 
even if doing so would serve system justification and just world motives.  When infection 
cannot be attributed to negatively viewed behavior (i.e., unsafe sex), it was expected that 
those low in motivation to control prejudice, and who believe orientation is a choice, 
would use the target’s sexual orientation—when the target is gay—to explain infection in 
an effort to maintain just-world beliefs.  However, for those who believe orientation is a 
choice, but who also are high in motivation to control prejudice, it was expected that their 
motivation to not appear prejudiced would result in them responding similarly to both 
gay and heterosexual targets, overriding the motives to system justify and maintain just-
world beliefs.   
Motivation to Control Prejudice 
 A large body of research indicates that motivation to control prejudiced responses 
is an important predictor of attitudes and reactions toward other stigmatized groups, such 
as Blacks (e.g., Butz & Plant, 2009; Dunton & Fazio, 1997).  For example, those who are 
highly motivated to control prejudice toward Blacks tend to report more positive 
interactions and attitudes toward Black individuals (Plant, Devine, & Peruche, 2010).  
Focusing on sexual orientation, people high rather than low in motivation to control 
prejudice based on sexual orientation tend to report less biased attitudes toward gay men 
and lesbians (Gailliot, Plant, Butz, & Baumelster, 2007; Lemm, 2006).   
Given the evidence suggesting that stereotyping of stigmatized groups can be 
influenced by various motivations (see Kunda & Sinclair, 1999), I propose that 
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motivation to control prejudice is another form of motivated reasoning, with those high in 
motivation to control prejudice making considerable effort to avoid responding in a 
prejudiced manner, regardless of if they are in fact biased against the group in question.  
In Study 3, it was expected that motivation to control prejudice would moderate the 
effects in Study 2 such that among those who believe sexual orientation is a choice, only 
those that are low in motivation to control prejudice would show more biased reactions to 
gay applicants.  In other words, motivation to control prejudice was expected to serve as 
a competing motive that would override the effects of the motives to system justify and 
maintain just-world beliefs.  Among participants who believe orientation is a choice, and 
who are responding to an applicant who did not have control over their infection, only 
those who are also low in motivation to control prejudice will be less likely support 
admittance to the prescription drug coverage program.  Those who believe sexual 
orientation is a choice, but who are also high in motivation to control prejudice, were 
expected to respond similarly to those who do not believe orientation is a choice.   
Study 3 Hypothesis 
Hypothesis: Motivation to control prejudice as a moderator of Study 2 
effects.  Participants who are unmotivated to control prejudice and who believe 
orientation is a choice will be less likely to support admittance when infection is 
uncontrollable and the applicant is gay (rather than heterosexual) in comparison to their 
motivated to control prejudice counterparts.  Participants who do not believe orientation 
is a choice or who are motivated to control prejudice will respond similarly to both gay 
and heterosexual applicants.   
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Participants and Design 
Four-hundred and sixty nine heterosexual participants completed the study.  
Forty-nine participants who failed the manipulation check were excluded, resulting in a 
final sample size of 420.  The majority of participants were from a large Mid-western 
university (n = 393).  Additionally, the sample included 27 participants from a 
moderately sized university on the West Coast.  All participants completed the study 
online and received course credit for their participation.  Sixty-one percent of the 
participants were female; ages ranged from 18 to 46 with a mean age of 20.   
Procedure 
Similar to Study 2, participants first read a vignette about an HIV positive male 
applying for a prescription drug coverage program.  After reading the vignette, 
participants completed measures of their support for admittance to the prescription drug 
coverage program, attributions of responsibility, control, and blame, beliefs regarding 
whether sexual orientation is a choice, and attitudes towards gay men.  Additionally, 
participants completed a measure of their motivation to control prejudiced responses (see 
Appendix C for study materials).   
Predictor Variables  
 Applicant sexual orientation and method of disease transmission.  As in Study 
2, the study started by having participants read a vignette about an HIV positive male 
applying for a prescription drug coverage program.  The vignettes were updated to 
address potential issues in the first study, described above.  First, the vignette for the 
uncontrollable condition was changed such that infection occurred through blood 
transfusion, as opposed to exposure via infected medical equipment in Study 2.  
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Additionally, more detail was included in the vignettes, focusing on adding more 
information about how infection occurred.  For example, in the uncontrollable infection 
condition the vignette explicitly said that infection was beyond the target’s control.  The 
added detail to the vignettes roughly doubled their length.  Finally, the age of the 
applicant was increased from 25 to 28 for two reasons.  First, increasing the age resulted 
in a greater difference between the average age of the participants completing the study 
(M = 19.6, SD = 2.6) and the applicant.  It was expected that increasing the age of the 
applicant might make it less likely for participants to perceive the applicant as a fellow 
college student, thus decreasing perceived similarity between participants and the 
applicant.   
 Perceptions regarding sexual orientation as a choice.  Participants completed a 
3-item  measure of beliefs regarding sexual orientation as a choice using a 5-point Likert-
type response scale, with higher scores indicating greater support for the belief that 
sexual orientation is a choice (α = .88).  
Motivation to control prejudiced responses.  After reporting their beliefs 
regarding sexual orientation as a choice, participants completed the motivation to control 
prejudiced reactions scale (Dunton & Fazio, 1997).  The measure includes 17-items such 
rated on a 5-point Likert-type scale, with higher scores indicating greater motivation to 
control prejudiced responses (α = .81).  Although most questions on the scale refer to 
prejudice in general, some items originally referred to interactions with Black men.  
Consistent with previous studies that have used this scale when examining prejudice 
based on sexual orientation (e.g., Jellison, McConnell, & Gabriel, 2004) those items were 
modified to reflect prejudice toward gay men.  For example, the item “I feel guilty when I 
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have a negative thought or feeling about a black man” was changed to “I feel guilty when 
I have a negative thought or feeling about a gay man.”   
Dependent Variable  
 As in Study 2, participants reported support for admittance to the prescription 
drug coverage program (α = .81).   
Results and Discussion 
 Study 3 utilized multiple regression to test the study hypotheses using a 2(Sexual 
orientation: heterosexual vs. gay) x 2(Method of disease transmission: controllable vs. 
uncontrollable) x Orientation as a choice (continuous) x Motivation to control prejudice 
(continuous) design.  Prior to the analyses all dependent variables were tested for 
normality and it was determined all were within normal bounds for skew and kurtosis, 
thus no transformations were needed.   
It was predicted that whether participants’ perceptions regarding sexual 
orientation as a choice would influence reactions towards people living with HIV/AIDS 
would be determined based on their motivation to control prejudice.  In other words, it 
was predicted that motivation to control prejudice would be an additional limitation to 
using the targets sexual orientation to explain why infection occurred when infection 
cannot be attributed to a specific behavior (i.e., unprotected sex).  Specifically, 
motivation to control prejudice was expected to serve as a moderator of the effects found 
in Study 2, such that the effects found in Study 2 would only occur among those low in 
motivation to control prejudice.  In other words, when motivation to control prejudice is 
low, participants who believe orientation is a choice were expected to report less support 
for admittance when infection was uncontrollable and the target is gay, rather than 
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heterosexual.  When motivation to control prejudice is high, it was predicted that 
perceptions regarding sexual orientation as a choice would no longer be a significant 
predictor of support for admittance.  Regardless of their beliefs regarding whether sexual 
orientation is a choice, it was expected that among those who are highly motivated to 
control prejudice, the only significant predictor for reactions would be method of disease 
transmission—sexual orientation was not expected to influence reactions among these 
participants.6   
Multiple regression procedures were used to test for the proposed four-way 
interaction between motivation to control prejudice, beliefs regarding orientation as a 
choice, method of disease transmission, and applicant sexual orientation.  All interactions 
were examined by utilizing the strategies for probing interactions in multiple regression 
as outlined by Aiken & West (1991).  Although all independent variables were centered 
for the regression analyses, all means and standard deviations are presented in their 
original form for ease of interpretation.  The overall fit of the model predicting support 
for admittance to the prescription drug coverage program was significant [R2 = .32, F(15, 
404) = 12.62, p < .01], indicating that it was appropriate to move forward with examining 
main effects and interactions within the model.   
                                                 
6
 There was significant negative relationship between motivation to control prejudice and 
beliefs regarding sexual orientation as a choice, r = -.24, p < .01, with greater motivation 
to control prejudice associated with the tendency to believe that sexual orientation is a 
choice.  Although the weak correlation does indicate that the constructs are relatively 
distinct, the significant correlation also indicates that one may inform the other in a 
biased way.  That is, perhaps, those who believe sexuality is a choice tend to be less 
motivated to control their bias towards gay men and lesbians.  Alternatively, it could be 
that lack of a motivation to be viewed as prejudiced increases the likelihood that people 
will feel comfortable reporting that they believe sexual orientation is a choice. 
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Consistent with Study 2, there was a main effect for transmission [b = 1.81, t(404) 
= 11.16, p < .01, sr2 = .210] such that participants were less likely to support admittance 
when infection was controllable (unsafe sex; M = 16.3, SD = 3.7) rather than 
uncontrollable (blood transfusion; M = 20.0, SD = 2.9).  Additionally, there was a main 
effect for participants’ beliefs regarding sexual orientation as a choice [b = -.08, t(404) = 
-2.48, p < .01, sr2 = .010], indicating that the more strongly participants endorse the belief 
that sexual orientation is a choice, the less likely they are to support admittance, 
regardless of the applicants sexual orientation or method of disease transmission.7 
These main effects were qualified by a significant four-way interaction between 
motivation to control prejudice, beliefs regarding orientation as a choice, method of 
disease transmission, and applicant sexual orientation [b = .01, t(404) = 2.24, p < .05, sr2 
= .008].  As shown in the simple slopes analyses discussed next, this interaction reflects 
the finding that those low in motivation to control prejudice and who believe orientation 
is a choice are less likely to support admittance when infection was uncontrollable (i.e., 
occurring through blood transfusion) and the target was gay rather than heterosexual.   
To examine the four-way interaction, I started by looking at participants with 
motivation to control prejudice scores one standard deviation below (low motivation; M = 
45.3) and one standard deviation above (high motivation; M = 61.4) the mean.  Among 
those high in motivation to control prejudice, the only significant predictor of support for 
                                                 
7
 The main effect of participants’ beliefs regarding sexual orientation as a choice was also 
qualified by two significant two-way interactions not discussed due to them also being 
qualified by the significant three-way interaction. Specifically, there was a significant 
two-way interaction between applicants sexual orientation and participants’ beliefs 
regarding whether sexual orientation is a choice [b = -.08, t(404) = -2.66, p <.01], as well 
as between participants’ beliefs regarding sexual orientation as a choice and motivation to 
control prejudice [b = .01, t(404) = 2.14, p <.05].   
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admittance was a main effect of method of disease transmission [b = 1.79, t(404) = 7.82, 
p <.01].  Participants high in motivation to control prejudice were less likely to support 
admittance when infection occurred through unsafe sex (M = 15.9, SD = 2.9) than when 
infection occurred through blood transfusion (M = 20.7, SD = 2.8).  However, among 
participants low in motivation to control prejudice, a significant three-way interaction 
between beliefs regarding orientation as a choice, method of disease transmission, and 
applicant sexual orientation was found on support for admittance [b = -.09, t(404) = -
2.12, p < .05], similar to Study 2.  To explore this interaction, the effects of method of 
disease transmission and applicant sexual orientation were examined separately for those 
one standard deviation below (do not believe orientation is a choice; M = 10.7) and above 
(strongly believe that orientation is a choice; M = 21.4) the mean on beliefs regarding 
orientation as a choice. 
Among those who are low in motivation to control prejudice and do not believe 
orientation is a choice, only method of disease transmission influenced support for 
admittance [b = 1.56, t(404) = 2.94, p < .01].  Participants low in motivation to control 
prejudice and who do not believe orientation is a choice were less likely to support 
admittance when infection occurred through unsafe sex (i.e., controllable; M = 13.4, SD = 
6.0) than when infection occurred through blood transfusion (i.e., uncontrollable; M = 
23.5, SD = 7.1).  These effects occurred regardless of the applicant’s sexual orientation.  
However, among participants low in motivation to control prejudice and who do believe 
sexual orientation is a choice, when infection was uncontrollable these participants were 
less likely to support admittance for gay (M = 14.8, SD = 4.6) than heterosexual (M = 
22.0, SD = 3.7) applicants [b = -1.15, t(404) = -2.74, p < .01] (See Figure 6; sexual 
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orientation did not influence reactions when infection was controllable [b = -.09, t(404) = 
-.26, p = .80])8. 
To summarize, overall participants were less likely to support admittance to the 
prescription drug coverage program when infection was controllable, rather than 
uncontrollable.  However, among participants who are low in motivation to control 
prejudice and who believe that sexual orientation is a choice, when infection was 
uncontrollable these participants were less likely to support admittance to the prescription 
drug coverage program for gay (rather than heterosexual) applicants.  For those who 
believe orientation is a choice but who are also high in motivation to control prejudice, 
there was no difference in reactions to gay and heterosexual applicants.  Consistent with 
expectations based on a motivated reasoning perspective, when infection could not be 
attributed to a specific negatively viewed behavior, the applicant's sexual orientation was 
only used to justify infection when participants believe that orientation is a choice and 
they are unmotivated to control prejudiced responses.    
An additional finding that was not reflected in the study hypotheses was the main 
effect for participants’ beliefs that sexual orientation is a choice.  Participants who 
believe orientation is a choice were less likely to support admittance to the prescription 
drug coverage program regardless of the how infection occurred or the applicants sexual 
orientation.  One possible explanation is that participants who believe orientation is a 
                                                 
8
 In Study 3 similar effects using negative attributions (e.g., control, responsibility and 
blame) were found.  Specifically, there was a four-way interaction [b = .01, t(404) = 2.24, 
p < .05, sr2 = .003] revealing that when infection was uncontrollable, participants low in 
motivation to control prejudice and who believe orientation is a choice made more 
negative attributions (e.g., that the applicant is to blame for their illness) [b = 2.64, t(404) 
= 3.48, p < .01] when the applicant was gay (M = 31.2, SD = 12.8) rather than 
heterosexual (M = 17.0, SD = 4.3).   
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choice are also more strongly endorse negative stereotypes about people living with 
HIV/AIDS (e.g., homosexuality, engaging in unsafe sex or drug use) and that these 
stereotypes influence judgments regardless of the characteristics of the person infected or 
how infection occurred.  Future work may want to address this possibility.   
General Discussion 
 The primary goal of these studies was utilize a motivated reasoning perspective to 
help understand the role of target sexual orientation and method of disease transmission 
in reactions to people living with HIV/AIDS.  Although there was consensus in previous 
research that the sexual orientation of people living with HIV/AIDS can influence 
reactions towards them, under what conditions sexual orientation is a factor was unclear.  
The present work helped to clarify the role of sexual orientation and method of disease 
transmission in reactions to people living with HIV/AIDS, guided by predictions from 
system justification and just world theory.   
 Study 2 demonstrated that when people can attribute infection to negatively 
viewed behavior on the part of the applicant, people use that information to explain and 
justify infection, consistent with predictions from just world theory.  However, when 
infection was uncontrollable, participants who believe orientation is a choice responded 
more negatively to gay than heterosexual applicants.  This suggests that when infection 
was uncontrollable, these participants used the applicant’s sexual orientation—that they 
believe to be a personal choice—to explain why the person became infected.  By using 
the applicants' sexual orientation (when the applicant was gay), participants are able to 
maintain their just-world beliefs by coming up with an explanation for why infection 
occurred.  At the same time, by attributing infection to the gay applicant's sexual 
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orientation, participants are able to justify the system in which gay men are a 
disadvantaged group.  Because of the need for conclusions to appear rational, even when 
dealing with threats to just-world beliefs, it appears that participants who do not believe 
orientation is a choice were unable to use the applicant's sexual orientation as a way to 
explain infection.   
 Study 3 replicated these results while showing that motivation to control prejudice 
based on sexual orientation moderates the effects found in Study 2.  In other words, the 
three-way interaction between applicant sexual orientation, method of disease 
transmission, and participants belies regarding whether sexual orientation is a choice 
found in Study 2 occurred among those low in motivation to control prejudice, but not 
those high in motivation to control prejudice.  Participants high in motivation to control 
prejudice responded more negatively to applicants when infection was controllable rather 
than uncontrollable, regardless of their views regarding sexual orientation as a choice or 
the applicant’s sexual orientation.  Participants who are both low in motivation to control 
prejudice and who believe sexual orientation is a choice responded negatively to both gay 
and heterosexual applicants when infection was controllable.  However, when infection 
was uncontrollable these participants responded more negatively to gay than heterosexual 
applicants, consistent with the study predictions.  This is consistent with the prediction 
that those who believe orientation is a choice, but who are also high in motivation to 
control prejudice, would be constrained by the need for their conclusions to be rational 
and thus unable to justify responding more negatively to gay than heterosexual targets.  
In other words, motivation to control prejudice appears to have served as a competing 
motive that overrode the needs to maintain just-world beliefs and justify the system.   
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Together these studies helped to clarify the role of method of disease transmission 
and sexual orientation in reactions to people living with HIV/AIDS, guided by 
predictions from relevant theory.  Importantly, these findings shed light on the issues of 
prejudice and discrimination toward people living with HIV/AIDS, and in particular, the 
challenges faced by non-heterosexual people living with HIV/AIDS.  In Study 3, when 
infection was uncontrollable gay applicants faced more negative attributions and less 
support for admittance than heterosexual applicants from those who are low in motivation 
to control prejudice and who believe sexual orientation is a choice.  Of particular 
importance here is support for admittance to the prescription drug coverage program.  
People living with HIV/AIDS who do not receive proper health care are at risk for 
serious medical conditions that can be avoided with a consistent supply of medication.  
Others deeming people living with HIV/AIDS as less deserving of health care based on 
their sexual orientation could have serious long-term ramifications.   
 These studies also help addressing the overall goal of my program of research 
which is to add to current understanding of the role of motivated reasoning in victim 
blame, derogation, and prejudice.  Specifically, they added to the first by examining the 
role of just-world beliefs as another form of system-justifying ideology that contributes to 
victim blame, derogation, and prejudice.  Additionally, Study 3 examined the effects of 
potentially competing motives.  Specifically, the results of Study 3 indicate that 
motivation to control prejudice may serve as a competing motive that can override the 
motive to maintain just-world beliefs and to justify the system.   
 Finally, Studies 4 and 5 add to the first three studies in several ways.  First, it 
examines reactions to an individual who has been laid off from their job and whose group 
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identity is unknown (e.g., unknown race).  Second, it adds to the work in the Studies 2 
and 3 by measuring individual differences in endorsement of just-world beliefs.  Finally, 
it examines the effects of priming justice-related values on system justifying tendencies.  
Priming justice-related values was expected to intensify system justifying tendencies 
among those who strongly endorse just-world beliefs, with these participants responding 
even more negatively to the victim when they had not been primed.  However, among 
those low in endorsement of just-world beliefs, it was less clear how the primes may 
influence them.  As will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6, one possibility was that the 
prime would have no effect among those low in endorsement of just-world beliefs.  
Another possibility was that priming justice-related values may result in participants who 
are low in endorsement of just-world beliefs being made more aware of their beliefs that 
the world/system is not just, resulting in responding more positively to the victim than 
when not exposed to the justice-related primes.   
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Figure 4.  Admittance as a Function of Applicant Sexual Orientation and Method of 
Transmission Among Participants who Believe Orientation is a Choice - Study 2.
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Figure 5.  Admittance as a Function of Applicant Sexual Orientation and Method of 
Transmission Among Participants who Believe Sexual Orientation is Not a Choice - 
Study 2.  
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Figure 6.  Admittance as a Function of Applicant Sexual Orientation and Method of 
Transmission among Participants who Believe Sexual Orientation is a Choice and whom 
are Low in Motivation to Control Prejudice - Study 3.  
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CHAPTER 6: JUST-WORLD BELIEFS, JUSTICE-RELATED PRIMES, AND 
VICTIM BLAME9 
How we interact with the world around us is in large part dependent on what we 
believe are the basic rules and principles that guide how the world works (i.e., our 
worldview).  Various theories such as just-world theory (Lerner, 1980), system 
justification (Jost & Banaji, 1994), and the worldview verification model (Major, Kaiser, 
O’Brien, & McCoy, 2007) propose that central to our worldviews are beliefs regarding 
whether the world is fair and just.  Specifically, these perspectives suggest that people are 
motivated to believe that good things happen to good people and bad things happen to 
bad people.  Unfortunately, we are often confronted with demonstrations of unjustified 
negative occurrences happening to seemingly good people, such as when we see a news 
story on a senseless crime.   
The purpose of the current work is to examine the role certain values may play in 
just-world beliefs, and how activation of these values influences responses to an innocent 
victim.  It is proposed that one potential source and subsequent driving force of one’s 
just-world beliefs may be the development of moral beliefs including (but not limited to) 
the values of equality, justice, and entitlement.  Moreover, activation of these values may 
influence attributions for others’ circumstances, depending on an individual’s 
dispositional belief that the world is just.   
Values have been described as an abstract ordering of beliefs that serve as trans-
situational guides and ideals for evaluative and behavioral concerns (Feather, 1975; 
                                                 
9
 Edited version of Murray, R. A., Uggla, R. D., Blankenship, K. L., & Craig, T. Y. 
Worldviews and values: Belief in a just world moderates the effect of priming justice 
related values on victim blame and derogation. Manuscript submitted for publication.  
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Rohan, 2000; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987, 1990).  Rokeach (1968, 1973) suggested that the 
association between one’s judgments and one’s values is an important consideration in 
how individuals interact with their world.  Strongly held value-based opinions have been 
shown to influence the ability to fairly judge valid information that contradicts such 
beliefs (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979; Skitka & Mullen, 2008).  As such, the development 
and subsequent implementation of motivational states such as the values of equality, 
justice, and entitlement may play an important role in subsequent perceptions of victim 
responsibility and justice in general.  Therefore, the current work will examine the role 
that justice-related values, activated outside of awareness, play in person perception.   
Evidence has demonstrated that nonconscious activation and pursuit of important 
values, like justice, can motivate and direct perceptions in the same ways that consciously 
activated values do (e.g., Bargh & Chartrand, 2000).  For example, activating the value of 
honesty via a supraliminal priming task can lead participants to report less socially 
desirable more honest answers to socially sensitive questions than participants not primed 
with honesty (Rasinski, Visser, Zagatsky, & Rickett, 2005).  Similarly, simply activating 
the concept of justice by exposing participants to a picture of the Roman goddess of 
justice prior to a word completion task led participants to complete more word stems 
associated with justice than participants not primed with the justice picture (Karremans & 
Van Lange, 2005; Study 2).   
Thus, it appears that priming the concept of justice can lead to increases in 
activation of justice-related concepts.  Activation of these concepts should then guide 
people’s interpretation of information, such as attributions made about the victim of an 
unfortunate outcome.  However, it appears that no research to date has examined how 
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activation and application of justice-related concepts may be moderated by an 
individual’s just-world beliefs.  As reviewed in Chapter 3, individuals may vary in how 
much they endorse the belief that the world is just.  For example, some individuals may 
hold on to the belief that the world is just, initially developed in adolescence (Lerner, 
1977), and use it as a guide for perceiving the world around them, whereas others may 
see little utility in viewing the world as just and dismiss it altogether.  In addition, 
individuals who are high in endorsement of just-world beliefs may also view the concept 
of justice differently than those whose are low in endorsement of just-world beliefs.  For 
example, participants high in endorsement of just-world beliefs tend to endorse 
statements supporting procedural and distributive justice more than participants low in 
endorsement of just-world beliefs (Lucas, Alexander, Firestone, & Lebreton, 2007).  It is 
possible that activating justice-related concepts may increase people's motives to interpret 
information in a way that is consistent with their just-world beliefs.   
Applying this reasoning to the current research, values associated with justice, 
when activated outside of awareness, may guide how one interprets an event.  However, 
these effects may be moderated by an individual’s endorsement of just-world beliefs.  As 
reviewed in Chapter 3, instances of injustice are perceived as threats to those high in just-
world beliefs (Major et al., 2007).  However, for those low in endorsement of just-world 
beliefs, perceiving injustice is instead seen as a confirmation that the world is not just.  
This moderating effect may be especially pronounced in a context where violation of a 
just world is ambiguous.  In other words, activation of justice-related values in a context 
where it is unclear whether the person experiencing the unjust event is a “good” person 
(i.e., a victim) or if the person “got what they deserved” may be an appropriate context to 
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test these hypotheses.  Prior beliefs are more likely to guide judgments in ambiguous 
situations (Lord et al., 1979).  Further, when the target of a judgment is ambiguous, 
primes may interact with prior beliefs and thoughts to magnify judgments (Asch, 1948; 
Higgins, 1996).  Under these conditions, the effect of the prime on victim blame and 
derogation may be magnified by just-world beliefs.   
For example, Dion and Dion (1987) examined the influence of just-world beliefs 
in an impression formation setting.  After reading a description of a person, participants 
who strongly endorse just-world beliefs rated the person described as more socially 
desirable, having a more socially desirable personality, and having a higher positive life-
outcome when the description was paired with a photograph of an attractive, rather than 
unattractive, person.  Participants low in endorsement of just-world beliefs were not 
influenced by the type of photograph.  In other words, belief in a just world moderated 
the effect of attractiveness on judgments.   
Although participants low in endorsement of just-world beliefs were not 
influenced by the photograph, some research suggests that participants low in 
endorsement of just-world beliefs can be influenced by a contextual prime.  For example, 
Murray, Spadafore, and McIntosh (2005) primed participants with either rape-related 
words or neutral words prior to reading an ambiguous scenario about two people on a 
date.  Participants who strongly endorse just-world beliefs rated the female character 
more negatively when primed with the rape-related words than the neutral prime 
condition.  For participants low in endorsement of just-world beliefs, however, the victim 
was derogated less in the prime than control conditions.  Thus, it appears that individuals 
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high and low in endorsement of just-world beliefs may tend to interpret ambiguous 
situations differently, even when there is little initial threat to their just-world beliefs.10  
The Current Research 
The current research examined moderating role of just-world beliefs on the effect 
of priming values associated with belief in a just world (e.g., equality, justice and 
entitlement) on participants’ judgments of a victim.  Specifically, it was expected that a 
supraliminal prime of justice-related values would interact with participants’ just-world 
beliefs.  When activated, these values were expected to combine with just-world beliefs 
and guide how the scenario was interpreted, thereby influencing participants’ impressions 
of the victim. 
Among participants who strongly endorse just-world beliefs, priming justice-
related words may increase victim blame in the context of an ambiguous scenario.  That 
is, participants would report that the victim was more responsible for the outcome and as 
having more negative character attributes when primed with justice-related words relative 
to the neutral prime condition.  This would suggest that when activated, justice-related 
values would increase the tendency of people high in endorsement of just-world beliefs to 
                                                 
10
 Readers may be wondering why  participants low in endorsement of just-world beliefs 
were not influenced by a cue in Dion and Dion (1987), but not in the Murray et al. 
(2005). One reason may be that in the Dion and Dion (1987), participants low in 
endorsement of just-world beliefs were actually influenced by the photograph, but 
corrected for that influence in their judgments (Wegener & Petty, 1997; Wilson & 
Brekke, 1994).  However in Murray et al. (2005; as with many supraliminal priming 
studies), participants may not have been aware of the word prime (cf. Petty, DeMareee, 
Brinol, Horcajo, & Strathman, 2008), which would make correction of that prime 
difficult as best (Wegener & Petty, 1997).  This would particularly be the case if 
participants low in endorsement of just-world beliefs did view the concept of justice 
differently than those high in endorsement of just-world beliefs because the different 
definitions of justice may be guiding the effect of the prime on judgments in different 
directions.       
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blame the victim.  In other words, it was expected that priming justice-related values 
would enhance system-justifying tendencies among those who strongly endorse just-
world beliefs, resulting in more negative reactions to the victim.   
For participants low in endorsement of just-world beliefs, the predictions were 
less clear.  On the one hand, activation of justice-related values may not influence 
perceptions of the victim differently than in the neutral prime condition.  These results 
would be consistent with that of Dion and Dion (1987), whereby participants low in 
endorsement of just-world beliefs were not sensitive to the attractiveness of the photo in 
forming impressions.  However, if one were to believe that participants low in 
endorsement of just-world beliefs are just as susceptible to the activation of justice-
related values, these participants should show a decrease in victim blame relative to the 
control conditions.  This would suggest that people low in endorsement of just-world 
beliefs, when primed, are just as influenced by the value prime, but the concepts 
associated with the values may be applied differently when making assessments of 
blame.  If this is the case, participants low in endorsement of just-world beliefs may 
experience an increase in awareness of their beliefs that the world is not just, resulting in 
more positive reactions to the victim than when not primed with justice-related values.  In 
sum, understanding the extent to which values related to just-world beliefs are 
automatically activated is critical if theorists are to better understand worldview 
verification effects.   
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Study 4 Hypothesis 
 Hypothesis: Just-world beliefs as a moderator of priming effects on victim 
blame.  When primed with justice-related values, participants high in endorsement of 
just-world beliefs will blame the victim to a greater degree than when not primed with 
justice-related values.  Among those who are low in endorsement of just-world beliefs, 
priming justice-related values will either decrease or have no effect on victim blame.   
Study 4 
Participants  
Participants included eighty-two introductory psychology students at a Western 
university who completed the study for course credit11.   
Design and Procedure 
Study 4 utilized a 2(Prime: justice values vs. control) X Endorsement of just-
world beliefs (continuous) between-participants design.  Participants were brought into a 
lab and seated in front of a computer where all manipulations and measures were 
administered.  Participants were told they would be participating in two unrelated studies.  
The purpose of the first study (i.e., the priming phase) was to examine “word meaning 
recognition.”  For the priming portion, a synonym choice paradigm (Rasinski et al., 2005) 
was utilized.  Half of the participants were presented with the three values consistent with 
the idea of justice and three filler words, for a total of six words.  Each word was 
followed by three similar words in a multiple-choice format.  The remaining half of the 
participants were presented with three words unrelated to justice and three filler words, 
with each word followed by three similar words in a multiple-choice format.  Participants 
                                                 
11
 Demographic information (e.g., participant sex) was not collected for the studies in this 
project. 
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were asked to read each target word and then select which of the three similar words was 
most similar to the target word.  For example, participants were first presented with the 
target word “Justice,” followed by the words “compensation,” “evenness,” and “truth”.  
Participants then selected the word that is most semantically similar to the target word.    
In the second part of the study, participants read a scenario about a student from 
the University of Alabama named Tom.  In the scenario, Tom is described as an average 
student who got along well with others, but at times made people uncomfortable.  Upon 
graduating, Tom took a position at a local retail store, where he befriended the store 
manager.  The manager moved Tom into a managerial trainee position, but when the 
store manager was promoted, he transferred in another manager from a nearby store 
instead of moving Tom into the position and eventually Tom was laid off from the retail 
store.  The scenario was developed by the authors and was designed to be ambiguous 
with regard to whether Tom was a nice person, thus making it ambiguous as to whether a 
“just world” was violated.  That is, it is ambiguous whether Tom was a good or bad 
person who experienced an unfortunate outcome.  This provides an ideal context for the 
priming manipulation and prior beliefs to influence participants’ responses to the victim 
(Lord, et al., 1975; Murray, et al., 2005; Srull & Wyer, 1979).  Additionally, unlike 
Studies 1 through 3, the scenario does not directly threaten beliefs that the system is fair.  
This ambiguity allows for examining the role of activating justice related concepts on 
system justification outside of situations that induce threat.  
After reading the scenario, participants were asked to rate how responsible and 
deserving Tom was for the outcome as a means of measuring participants’ level of victim 
blame.  Finally, participants completed a measure of their endorsement of just-world 
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beliefs.  Upon completion of the various measures, participants completed a funnel 
debriefing that probed them for suspicion of the study’s purpose, were thanked for their 
participation and excused. 
Predictor Variables 
Value priming.  The priming manipulation was modeled after Rasinski et al 
(2005).  For this study, half of the participants were given three target words related to 
justice (e.g., justice, entitlement, equality), whereas the other half were given words 
unrelated to justice (e.g., home, march, hammer).  Each target word and its respective 
three options were presented in random order.   
Belief in a just world.  After the priming manipulation and the scenario, 
participants completed the seven-item global belief in a just world scale (Lipkus, 1991), a 
common measure of the extent to which people believe the world is just.  Scores on the 
seven items were summed to complete a total score, which was used as a predictor 
variable in subsequent analyses (α = .76), with higher scores indicating greater 
endorsement of just-world beliefs. 
Dependent Variable  
Victim blame.  Following the scenario, participants were asked to respond to 
three questions (α = .81) assessing the extent that Tom could be blamed for being laid off, 
with higher scores indicating greater blame.   
Results 
Participants’ blame scores were submitted to a simultaneous regression analysis, 
with endorsement of just-world beliefs scores (continuous), priming (control vs. justice 
values dummy coded as -1 = control and +1 = justice) and the interaction between the 
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two as the predictor variables.  Scores on endorsement of just-world beliefs were centered 
by subtracting the mean from each person’s score (Aiken & West, 1991; see also Cohen, 
Cohen, West & Aiken, 2003), thus making the predicted values interpretable.  The 
overall fit for the model predicting blame [R2 = .12, F(3, 78) = 3.47, p = .02] was 
significant, indicating that it was appropriate to examine the hypothesized interaction.   
Results revealed a significant Prime X Endorsement of just-world beliefs 
interaction, [b = .08, t(78) = 2.74, p < .01, sr2 = .08; see Figure 1], revealing just-world 
beliefs moderated the influence of the justice prime on participants’ blaming of Tom.  
Specifically, decomposition of this interaction by recentering endorsement of just-world 
belief scores at one standard deviation above (M = 34.9; high in endorsement of just-
world beliefs) and one standard deviation below the mean (M = 21.7; low in endorsement 
of just-world beliefs; Aiken & West, 1991) indicated that participants low in endorsement 
of just-world beliefs, blamed Tom for the outcome less in the prime (M = 3.2, SD = 1.8) 
than the control (M = 4.9, SD = 1.9) condition [b = -.21, t(78) = 3.0, p < .05].  This 
suggests that, consistent with Murray et al.  (2005), participants low in endorsement of 
just-world beliefs were influenced by the prime, resulting in reports of less blame for 
Tom.   
In contrast, participants who strongly endorse just-world beliefs blamed Tom 
more in the prime (M = 5.0, SD = 1.6) than the control (M = 4.1, SD = 1.7) condition, [b 
= .48, t(78) = 3.07, p < .05].  That is, participants who strongly endorse just-world 
beliefs, when presented with an ambiguous situation and primed with justice-related 
concepts, tended to blame the victim at a higher level than when not exposed to the 
justice prime.  Thus, belief in a just world moderated the influence the value prime on 
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perceptions of victim blame.  Specifically, these results support the prediction that 
participants were sensitive to the justice prime regardless of their endorsement of just-
world beliefs.  Put another way, activation of justice-related values exacerbated the 
difference between the ways those high and low in endorsement of just-world beliefs 
respond to perceived inequality.12     
Discussion 
These results are a meaningful first step toward understanding how differences in 
endorsement of just-world beliefs may influence the effect activation of justice-related 
values on responses to an innocent victim.  Although previous work indicates that 
priming justice increases activation of justice-related concepts, research had yet to 
examine the potential moderating role of endorsement of just-world beliefs.  Based on 
previous research and theorizing described earlier, a Prime X Just-world beliefs 
interaction was expected on participants’ blame scores.  That is, for individuals relatively 
high in just-world beliefs, exposure to the justice prime was expected to lead to greater 
victim blame than in the neutral prime condition.  For individuals relatively low in just-
world beliefs, one of two possibilities was expected.  The first possibility was that 
                                                 
12
 Some may be wondering whether people were more likely to choose one answer over 
another for each of the prime words on the priming task.  Examination of the choices 
revealed that for the word justice, participants chose the term evenness (n = 18) and truth 
(n = 17) equally as being most similar to justice, but more than the term compensation 
(n= 5), χ2(2, n= 40) = 7.8, p < .05.  For the word entitlement, the terms merit (n = 15) and 
right (n= 20) were chose equally, with liberty (n= 5) chosen the least, χ2 (2, n = 40) = 
8.75, p < .05.  Finally, for the term equality, the term fairness (n = 24) was chosen more 
often than balance (n = 14), which was chosen more than impartiality (n = 2).  χ2 (2, n = 
40) = 18.2, p < .01.  More importantly, endorsement of just-world beliefs did not 
moderate the results χ2 (2, n = 40) = 1.62, p = .45, χ2 (2, n = 40) = 1.6, p = .5, χ2 (2, n = 
40) = 3.31, p = .19, for justice, entitlement, and equality, respectively).  These results 
suggest that belief in a just world did not influence participants’ responses on the priming 
manipulation. 
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exposure to the justice prime may not influence perceptions of victim blame, which 
would indicate that individuals low in endorsement of just-world beliefs are not sensitive 
to the justice prime.  The second possibility was that exposure to the justice prime may 
lead to decreased victim blame relative to the control condition.  In other words, 
activation of justice may occur for participants low in just-world beliefs and can still be 
applied to their judgments.   
Consistent with the study hypothesis, among those high in endorsement of just-
world beliefs, exposure to the justice prime resulted in greater victim blame than when 
exposed to neutral primes.  In other words, priming justice-related values increased 
system justifying tendencies among those who are high in endorsement of just-world 
beliefs, resulting in greater victim blame.  Results also indicated that priming justice-
related values also influences victim blame for those low in endorsement of just-world 
beliefs.  Specifically, priming justice-related values resulted in reduced victim blame 
among these participants, in comparison to a neutral prime.  Among these participants, it 
appears that priming justice-related values may have made them more aware of their 
beliefs that the world/system is not just, resulting in reduced victim blame.  These results 
suggest that just-world beliefs may determine how values guide interpretation of 
ambiguous information and that participants both low and high in just-world beliefs are 
sensitive to the justice prime.   
Study 5 
Study 4 helped to clarify the potential moderating role of endorsement of just-
world beliefs on the effect of justice-related primes on victim blame.  Of course, these 
results should also translate into a measure of the victim’s character.  That is, in addition 
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to just-world beliefs moderating the effect of the justice prime on victim blame, there 
should be similar effects on measures of the victim’s character.  As such, the purpose of 
Study 5 is to replicate the effects found in Study 4 and to examine whether assessments 
of the victim’s character are subject to the same pattern of results.   
Study 5 Hypothesis 
 Hypothesis: Just-world beliefs as a moderator of the effect of priming on 
character assessment.  When primed with justice-related values, participants high in 
endorsement of just-world beliefs will attribute greater blame and report more negative 
character attributions (i.e., derogate the victim) than when primed with justice-related 
values.  Among those who are low in endorsement of just-world beliefs, priming justice-
related values will decrease blame and result in more positive character attributions.   
Participants 
Ninety-one introductory psychology students at a Western university participated 
in a 2(Prime: justice values vs. control) X Just-world beliefs (continuous) between-
participants design.   
Design and Procedure 
Participants were given the same cover story and materials as in Study 4, with one 
exception.  Specifically, after completing measures of victim blame, participants 
completed a measure assessing Tom’s character using items taken from the personal 
attribute inventory scale (Parish, Bryant & Shirazi, 1976).   
Predictor Variables 
Just-world beliefs.  Participants completed the same just-world beliefs scale as in 
Study 4 (α = .74).   
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Value priming.  Participants completed the same priming manipulation as in 
Study 4.   
Dependent variables 
Victim blame.  As in Study 4, participants were asked to report how responsible 
Tom was for being laid off from work.  A second item asked the extent to which 
participants felt being laid off from work was the result of Tom’s own doing.  The two 
items were moderately correlated (r = .58) and were combined to create an index of 
victim responsibility.13  
Victim derogation.  Following the priming manipulation, the scenario, and the 
blame measure, participants were asked to rate Tom’s character.  Specifically, 
participants rated Tom on the dimensions of irresponsibility, carelessness, impatience, 
greed, and selfishness (1 = not at all characteristic of Tom; 9 = very characteristic of 
Tom; α = .71).   
Results and Discussion 
Victim blame.  Similar to Study 4, victim blame scores were submitted to a 
simultaneous regression analysis, with just-world belief scores (centered), the value 
prime (value vs. control dummy coded as -1 = control and +1 = value), and the 
interaction between the two as predictor variables.  The overall fit for the model 
predicting blame [R2 = .11, F(3, 87) = 3.59, p < .05] was significant, indicating that it was 
appropriate to examine the hypothesized interaction.  The analysis revealed the predicted 
Prime X Just-world beliefs interaction [b = .69, t(87) = 2.24, p < .05, sr2 = .05].  That is, 
participants low in endorsement of just-world beliefs (M = 21.3) rated Tom less 
                                                 
13
 The item measuring whether the outcome was a result of Tom’s own doing used in 
Study 1 was inadvertently omitted in Study 2. 
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responsible for the outcome in the prime (M = 3.1, SD = 1.7) than in the control condition 
(M = 4.0, SD = 1.9), [b = -.38, t(87) = 2.37, p < .05].  In contrast, participants high in 
endorsement of just-world beliefs (M = 34.9) rated Tom more responsible for the 
outcome in the prime (M = 5.8, SD = 1.9) than the control condition (M = 4.6, SD = 2.0) 
[b = .49, t(87) = 2.65, p < .05].  Thus, a replication of Study 4 occurred, with participants 
both relatively high and low in endorsement of just-world beliefs being sensitive to the 
justice prime.   
Victim derogation.  Next, victim derogation scores were submitted to a 
simultaneous regression analysis, with endorsement of just-world beliefs, the priming 
manipulation, and the interaction as predictor variables.  The overall fit for the model 
predicting derogation [R2 = .09, F(3, 87) = 2.81, p < .05] was significant, indicating that it 
was appropriate to examine the hypothesized interaction.  Results revealed a significant 
Prime X Just-world beliefs interaction, [b = .49, t(87) = 2.82, p < .01, sr2 = .08], revealing 
that just-world beliefs moderated the effect of the prime on participants’ victim 
derogation scores.  Specifically, participants low in endorsement of just-world beliefs, 
rated Tom more positively in the prime (M = 5.7, SD = 1.3) than the control condition (M 
= 6.6, SD = 1.6), [b = .25, t(87) = 1.99, p < .05].  In contrast, participants high in 
endorsement of just-world beliefs rated Tom more negatively in the prime (M = 5.1, SD = 
1.7) than the control condition (M = 4.2, SD = 1.7), [b = .30, t(87) = 2.23, p < .05].  Thus, 
similar to the blame measure, participants’ just-world beliefs moderated the effect of the 
prime on judgments of the victim’s character.   
Mediational analyses.  It was expected that victim blame would account for the 
interactive effects of Prime and Just-world beliefs on victim derogation (captured by the 
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Prime X Just-world beliefs term).  A mediational analysis using bootstrapping procedures 
outlined by Shrout and Bolger (2002; using the syntax presented by Preacher & Hayes, 
2004) was conducted to examine the indirect effect and the associated 95% confidence 
interval of victim blame on victim derogation.  The bootstrapping analyses randomly 
drew cases from the sample data (with replacement) and created 5000 bootstrap data sets 
of equal size to the original sample.  Each data set supplied an estimate of the indirect 
(mediational) effect of the potential mediator.  The Prime X Just-world beliefs interaction 
was treated as the distal variable and the Prime X Blame interaction was treated as a 
potential mediator, with derogation as the dependent variable.  Lower order effects of 
Prime, Just-world beliefs, and Blame were treated as covariates.  Confidence intervals 
were created to examine whether the population value of each indirect effect differed 
from zero (i.e., whether the 95% confidence interval for the indirect effects excluded 
zero).  Results showed that the Prime X Blame interaction term did mediate the 
interactive effect of Prime and Just-world beliefs on derogation (b = .02, 95% CI: .01 to 
.04).  The direct effect of the Prime X Just-world beliefs interaction was no longer 
significant [b = .04, t(85) = .88, p = .43].  In other words, activation of justice-related 
values increased perceptions of victim blame, which then influenced victim derogation. 
General Discussion 
The present research tested the hypothesis that endorsement of just-world beliefs 
would moderate the effects of a justice-related prime on participants’ responses to an 
unjust event.  Across two studies, when primed with justice-related values it appears that 
participants who strongly endorse just-world beliefs likely acted to protect their just-
world beliefs by blaming and derogating the victim more than when not primed with 
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justice values.  Conversely, participants low in endorsement of just-world beliefs showed 
the opposite trend when primed with these values, reporting lower levels of victim blame 
and derogation compared to those not primed with justice values.  These findings suggest 
that justice-related values may act to guide how the participants interpreted the 
ambiguous scenario information (see Feather, 1994).  Specifically, the activation of 
justice-related values through the priming task appears to alter the extent that participants 
engage in system justification.   
The aforementioned findings suggest several things.  First, the influence of 
individuals’ just-world beliefs on the judgments of others may be mediated by 
worldview-related values (i.e.  justice, deservingness, entitlement).  This reasoning is 
consistent with current models of justice reasoning, which suggest that people are more 
likely to consider justice when self-relevant values like equality and social justice are 
made salient (Skitka, 2003).  Secondly, justice-related values, when activated, may affect 
people who differ in the extent that they endorse just-world beliefs based on the strength 
of those beliefs.  When primed with justice-related values, those who are high in 
endorsement just-world beliefs tend to blame and derogate the victim to a greater degree 
than when not primed with justice-related values, finding them more deserving of their 
fate.  In other words, when primed with justice-related values, participants who strongly 
endorse just-world beliefs appear to engage in system justification to a greater degree, 
resulting in more negative reactions to the victim.  On the other hand, individuals low in 
endorsement of just-world beliefs, when primed with justice-related values, tended to 
show lower levels of victim blame and derogation, finding the victim less deserving of 
their fate.  Among these participants, it appears that priming justice-related values may 
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remind them of their beliefs that the world is not just, resulting in responding more 
positively to the victim (i.e., lowering the tendency to system-justify).   
This work also adds to the overall program of research by examining the role of 
system justification motives (in this case, just-world beliefs) in a situation where these 
beliefs had not been directly threatened (unlike Studies 1-3).  As was reviewed, the 
description of Tom in the vignette was designed to be ambiguous as to whether he was a 
good or bad person, thus it was unclear whether a just world had been violated.  Although 
it is possible this ambiguity produced some level of threat on its own, people are often 
faced with situations where they have to make a judgment about another’s circumstances 
without having information that would allow them to judge the individuals character. 
These studies help address the role of system justification related motives in situations 
where it is unclear whether justice-related beliefs have been violated.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
 Despite showing initial evidence that just-world beliefs can moderate priming 
effects on judgments, a number of questions remain.  First, one could argue that because 
participants were exposed to the value prime manipulation prior to completing the 
measure of endorsement of just-world beliefs, the manipulation may have resulted in 
differences in the extent that participants report endorsement of just world-beliefs.  Such 
an effect would be reflected in a difference in participants’ endorsement of just-world 
beliefs scores differing by the value prime.  However, the results of an independent t-test 
revealed that the prime did not create differences in participants’ endorsement of just-
world beliefs scores in Study 4 (Mcontrol = 27.8, SD = 7.1; Mjustice = 28.9, SD = 6.1 for 
high, t(80) = -.76 , p = .45) or Study 5 (Mcontrol = 28.5, SD = 7.1; Mjustice = 27.8, SD = 6.7, 
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t(89) = .50 , p = .62).  Thus, across both studies, the justice prime did not influence 
endorsement of just-world beliefs.  Therefore, while possible, it is unlikely that the prime 
influenced participants’ endorsement of just-world beliefs. 
Another question revolves around the mechanism behind the effects of the prime.  
Studies 4 and 5 suggest that participants both low and high in endorsement of just-world 
beliefs are sensitive to the justice prime, but the prime leads participants to form 
judgments of the same information in different directions depending on adherence to the 
belief in a just world.  Although the results from Studies 4 and 5 cannot directly speak to 
the issue of mechanism, how one of a number of processes may be occurring is addressed 
below.   
First, the mechanism may be the typical assimilation and contrast effects seen in 
many priming studies (see DeCoster & Claypool, 2004 for a review).  That is, 
participants high in endorsement of just-world beliefs may have their judgments 
assimilated in a direction consistent with the justice prime.  This assimilation results in 
increases in victim blame and derogation seen in the present studies among those who 
strongly endorse just-world beliefs.  However, participants low in endorsement of just-
world beliefs may have their judgments contrasted away from the justice prime, which is 
reflected in their judgments being less harsh than in the control group.  Of course, the 
above explanation assumes that participants’ definitions of justice are consistent across 
participants’ levels of endorsement of just-world beliefs.  That is, activation of the same 
semantic content associated with the concept of justice would have to occur in order for 
participants high in endorsement of just-world beliefs to have their judgments become 
more consistent with the prime, while others low in endorsement of just-world beliefs 
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have their judgments become inconsistent with the prime (Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 
1977).   
Alternatively, the results from the present studies could be the result of 
assimilation for participants both low and high in endorsement of just-world beliefs.  
Exposure to the justice-related prime may create a context where the meanings of justice 
are even more salient and more likely to guide subsequent judgments.  Exposure may 
also magnify the interpretation of the concepts associated with the prime, which would 
lead to the effects found in Studies 4 and 5.  Based on this reasoning, it is expected that 
participants would perceive justice differently depending on the combination of their 
endorsement of just-world beliefs scores and the justice prime.   
Participants low in endorsement of just-world beliefs were expected to be more 
likely to endorse concepts of fairness and equality following the justice rather than 
neutral prime.  On the other hand, participants high in endorsement of just world-beliefs 
were expected to be less likely to endorse concepts of fairness and equality following the 
justice prime rather than the neutral prime.  In other words, if it is the case that justice 
may mean different things to different people depending on their level of endorsement 
just-world beliefs (as in Lucas et al., 2007), participants low in endorsement of just-world 
beliefs, when primed with the justice-related values, may also be assimilating to the 
justice prime, but the content associated with justice may be different from that for 
participants high in endorsement of just-world beliefs.  This effect may be seen as the 
judgments of equality and fairness for participants low in endorsement of just-world 
beliefs being even more extreme in the direction of fairness and equality than in the 
opposite direction where they would be contrasting with justice.   
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To test this possibility, 181 participants first completed the global beliefs in a just 
world scale (Lipkus, 1991) and then completed either the justice prime or neutral prime 
word meaning task used in Studies 4 and 5.  Following the prime, participants were 
presented with the word “Justice” and were asked to rate how much of their view of 
justice was related to the words “fairness” and “equality” on a 9 point scale (1 = 
inconsistent with my idea of justice; 9 = consistent with my idea of justice).  The two 
scores were correlated (r = .57, p <.01) and were averaged to create a single index.   
The overall fit for the model predicting perceptions of justice [R2 = .12, F(3, 177) 
= 4.93, p < .01] was significant, indicating that it was appropriate to examine the 
hypothesized interaction.  The results of the 2(Prime: neutral vs. justice) X Endorsement 
of just-world beliefs score regression revealed the predicted interaction [b = -.27, t(177) = 
-3.57, p < .01, sr2 = .08].  Participants low in endorsement of just-world beliefs rated 
justice as more consistent with the concepts of fairness and equality in the justice-prime 
(M = 6.6, SD = 1.3) than in the neutral prime (M = 5.8, SD = 1.3) conditions, [b = -.21, 
t(177) = 2.62, p < .01].  In contrast, among participants who strongly endorse just-world 
beliefs, there was no difference in perceptions of justice between the justice (M = 6.2, SD 
= 1.5) and neutral prime (M = 6.9, SD = 1.4) conditions, [b = -.16, t(177) = -1.49, p = 
.14], but the predicted scores are in a direction consistent with justice being less 
consistent with fairness and equality in the prime than control conditions.  Thus, it 
appears that the justice prime changed the relation between just-world beliefs and 
participants’ perceptions of justice, suggesting this as a possible mechanism for the 
results found in Studies 4 and 5.  Future work should examine this possibility in more 
detail.   
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Figure 7.  Individual differences in just-world beliefs as a moderator of the effect of 
prime condition on victim blame - Study 4.  
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Figure 8.  Individual differences in just-world beliefs as a moderator of the effect of 
prime condition on victim blame - Study 5.  
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Figure 9.  Individual differences in just-world beliefs as a moderator of the effect of 
prime condition on victim derogation - Study 5.  
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CHAPTER 7: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 The primary goal of the five studies presented was to utilize a motivated 
reasoning perspective to help advance research on work ethic and just-world beliefs.  
Specifically, system justification theory was utilized to help understand the effects of 
work ethic and just-world beliefs on prejudice, discrimination, and victim blame.  
Together these studies examine reactions to individuals in a wide variety of situations, 
including applying for a job, seeking healthcare assistance, and having been laid off from 
a job.  Across these situations, I examined what role work ethic and just-world beliefs 
play in responses to these individuals, ranging from prejudice and discrimination based 
on race or sexual orientation, to victim blame, even when group membership is unknown.   
Summary of Results 
Study 1 explored the potential moderating role of work-ethic beliefs and applicant 
race in responses to an individual applying for a job.  As predicted, among participants 
low in endorsement of work-ethic beliefs, only resume quality influenced their thoughts 
and impressions in response to the applicant, such that they responded more positively 
when resume quality was high.  On the other hand, among those high in endorsement of 
work-ethic beliefs, when resume quality was low these participants reported more 
negative thoughts and impressions in response to the Black, rather than White, applicant.  
These results were consistent with the study hypotheses such that participants high in 
endorsement of work-ethic beliefs appear to have used the applicants race to justify more 
negative reactions to the Black applicant when resume quality was low.   
As reviewed in Chapter 4, this pattern of effects only occurred for participant’s 
thoughts and impressions.  One possible explanation for this is that there may be 
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competing motives influencing participants’ reactions.  For example, those low in 
endorsement of work-ethic beliefs may have reported greater support for hiring the 
Black, rather than White, applicant when resume quality was low because of their beliefs 
that hard work does not always lead to outcomes consistent with one’s efforts (i.e., their 
awareness that they system is not just).  Among those high in endorsement of work-ethic 
beliefs, it’s possible that another competing motive, such as the motivation to control 
prejudiced responses, stopped these participants from letting their more negative thoughts 
and impressions for the Black applicant (when resume quality was low) influence their 
support for hiring.   
 Studies 2 and 3 examined reactions to individuals applying for a free prescription 
drug coverage program based on the applicant’s sexual orientation (Gay vs. Heterosexual 
male), how infection occurred (Controllable vs. Uncontrollable), participant’s beliefs 
regarding whether sexual orientation is a choice (Studies 2 and 3), and motivation to 
control prejudice (Study 3).  In Study 2, when infection was uncontrollable (i.e., exposure 
to infected medical equipment) participants who believe that sexual orientation is a 
choice reported less support for admission to the prescription drug coverage program 
when the applicant was gay, rather than heterosexual.  In other words, when infection 
was uncontrollable, it appears that these participants used the applicants sexual 
orientation (when the applicant was gay) to justify why infection occurred.  Study 3 
found that this effect was moderated by motivation to control prejudiced responses such 
that these participants only responded more negatively to the gay (vs. heterosexual) 
applicant whose infection was uncontrollable when they were also low in motivation to 
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control prejudice.  In other words, it appears that the motivation to control prejudice 
overrode any system-justifying motives (i.e., maintenance of just-world beliefs). 
 Finally, Studies 4 and 5 examined the effects of individual differences in 
endorsement of just-world beliefs and priming justice-related values (vs. a control) on 
reactions to an individual who had been laid off from their job.  As reported, these studies 
found that priming justice-related values among those who are high in endorsement of 
just-world beliefs resulted in increased system-justifying tendencies (i.e., victim blame 
and derogation).  On the other hand, among those low in endorsement of just-world 
beliefs, priming justice-related values resulted in reduced victim blame and derogation, 
indicating that the prime may have increased participant’s awareness of their belief that 
the world is not just, resulting in more positive reactions to the victim.  Additionally, 
Studies 4 and 5 added to Studies 1-3 by examining the role of system justification related 
motives in a situation where justice-related concepts had not been directly threatened 
(i.e., it was ambiguous as to if the individual deserved their fate).  
Limitations and Future Directions 
 Although this work adds to current understanding of the role of motivated 
reasoning when making judgments of others, there are limitations to the current work and 
many ways this research could be expanded upon.  Probably the biggest limitation is that 
the link between system justification and both work ethic and just-world beliefs was not 
directly tested.  Based on previous research and theorizing that suggests that individual 
differences in endorsement of work ethic and just-world beliefs reflect differences in 
people’s motivation to justify the system (i.e., Jost & Hunyady, 2005), I utilized a system 
justification perspective to derive study hypotheses, but the general motive to justify the 
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system was not directly measured.  Future work should directly test the link between the 
motive to justify the system and individual differences in work ethic and just-world 
beliefs.   
One way to address this question would be to test whether individual differences 
in the motive to justify the system would mediate of the effects of work ethic and just-
world beliefs on responses to individuals facing various negative outcomes (i.e., using the 
method outlined by Baron and Kenny, 1986).  If individual differences in the general 
motive to justify the system mediated these effects, it would support the idea that work 
ethic and just-world beliefs are in fact types of system-justifying motives.   
Another route to testing the meditational role of individual differences in system 
justification would be to a two study experimental approach as outlined by Spencer, 
Zanna, and Fong (2005).  Specifically, they argue that in cases where it is easily possible 
to measure and manipulate the proposed mediating process (in this case, system 
justification), it is advantageous to use a two-study experimental approach to test for 
mediation.  The first study would test whether the original manipulated independent 
variable (i.e., threat to just-world beliefs as in Studies 2) affects the hypothesized 
mediator (i.e., individual differences in system justification).  The second study would 
then manipulate the hypothesized mediator (e.g., manipulating the need to justify the 
system as in Study 2) and test its effect on the dependent variable (i.e., support for 
admittance to the prescription drug coverage program).  The key to this approach is that 
the researcher has to establish that both the measurement and manipulation of the 
mediator is tapping into the same variable, which can present a challenge.  However, the 
112 
 
main advantage to this approach is that it includes experimentally manipulating, rather 
than simply measuring, the potential mediator in an attempt to test causality.   
Future work may also want to examine the role of individual differences in the 
motive to justify the system as well as system justification associated motives on 
reactions to members of other disadvantaged groups (i.e., women) as well as individuals 
known to have advantaged group status (i.e., white males).  Examining the role of these 
motives may be particularly interesting when considering responses to women who face 
various negative circumstances.  For example, it seems likely that those prone to system 
justifying tendencies would be more likely to respond negatively to a woman who had 
been laid off from her job when the job was a non-traditional female occupied role (i.e., 
construction worker) rather than traditional role (i.e., nurse).  Responding more 
negatively to (i.e., blaming) a woman in a non-traditional role who loses that position 
may serve to support and justify the system where certain roles remain male dominated.   
  Another area that future work may what to examine is how different motives 
interact, including what other motives (in addition to the motive to avoid prejudiced 
responses) may reduce or intensify the motive to system-justify.  For example, it seems 
likely that those high in preference for consistency would be more prone to system 
justifying tendencies due to the fact that by justifying the system one is able to defend 
against arguments for change, thereby maintaining consistency.  The first step would be 
to measure individual differences in preference for consistency and system justification.  
If the two are in fact moderately to strongly correlated, the next step would be to test 
whether individuals high in preference for consistency are more prone to justify the 
system through actions such as victim blame.  For example, a paradigm similar to Study 
113 
 
3 could be utilized, with preference for consistency as the potential moderator of the 
effects of applicant sexual orientation and method of disease transmission on support for 
admittance to the prescription drug coverage program.  Here it would be expected that 
when infection was uncontrollable, participants high in preference for consistency would 
be less likely to support admittance when the applicant was gay, rather than heterosexual, 
and that this effect would be more pronounced than among those low in preference for 
consistency.   
 I believe the current work represents a first step in demonstrating the utility of a 
motivated reasoning perspective in examining the effects of both work ethic and just-
world beliefs in how people process information about others.  However, as noted in 
Chapter 1, I believe there are several areas that could benefit from this motivated 
reasoning perspective that have not yet been explored.  For example, some of the 
differences in how people prefer to process information that are discussed in Chapter 2, 
including preference for consistency and tolerance for ambiguity, have to my knowledge 
yet to have been examined from this motivated reasoning perspective.  Future research 
may benefit from utilizing a motivated reasoning perspective in examining the effects of 
individual difference factors such as these in a wide variety of domains, such as person 
perception, judgment and decision making, and political behavior.   
Finally, future work may want to how the motive to justify the system influences 
outcomes outside of responses to victims of negative circumstances.  For example, 
although previous work has examined the relationship between individual differences in 
the motive to justify the system and political ideology (e.g., Jost et al., 2003a), to my 
knowledge no research has examined how manipulating the extent that this motive is 
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active (i.e., through primes) may influence justice-related outcomes, such as voting 
behavior.   
Conclusion 
Together the five studies presented here utilize a motivated reasoning perspective 
to help examine various factors that contribute to prejudice, discrimination, and victim 
blame.  Specifically, based on previous work suggesting that work ethic and just-world 
beliefs are forms of system-justifying motives, system justification theory was utilized to 
predict the role of work ethic and just-world beliefs on how people form impressions and 
make judgments about others.  Although future work should test for a direct link between 
system justification and both work ethic and just-world beliefs, the present work 
represents an important first step by examining the effects of these beliefs from a system 
justification perspective.   
In addition to helping understand the role of motivated reasoning in how 
information is processed, the results of the current work raise important questions as to 
what effect the desire to justify the system can have on how individuals respond to 
members of disadvantaged groups (e.g., gay men) or individuals facing negative life 
circumstances (e.g., job loss).  For example, Studies 2 and 3 examining reactions to 
people living with HIV/AIDS shed light on a potentially serious issue for health care 
providers.  Given the importance of quality healthcare in order to prevent serious 
complications for people living with HIV/AIDS, it is important to insure that stigma and 
bias do not influence patient care.  Health care providers should be aware of how 
attitudes regarding sexual orientation (including beliefs regarding sexual orientation as a 
choice) and method of disease transmission can influence how people respond to people 
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living with HIV/AIDS.  With this knowledge, they can design programs aimed at 
preventing bias from influencing patient care.  For example, it may be advisable to keep 
information that can trigger bias out of patient records, such as how infection occurred, 
and employers could implement training programs with the goal of increasing motivation 
to avoid prejudice and bias with patients.    
In sum, the current work helps demonstrate the important role that motives can 
have on how people process information about others, including in situations where 
judgments formed can seriously influence outcomes for another, such as when 
determining whether someone should receive a job or healthcare assistance.  Although 
the research presented here didn’t directly test the link between system justification and 
both work ethic and just-world beliefs, it presents an important first step by utilizing 
system justification theory to guide relevant predictions.  Future work should attempt to 
directly test the proposed link, as well as also focus on examining how additional motives 
can influence how information is processed, including how these motives may interact to 
influence behavior.    
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APPENDIX A: WORK-ETHIC BELIEFS AND HIRING – STUDY MATERIALS  
Work Ethic Beliefs and Hiring: Study Instructions 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
VERY IMPORTANT --- PLEASE READ 
CAREFULLY 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
First, you will review a resume for a person applying for an office manager position. If 
this person is hired, they will manage approximately 10 employees, monitoring employee 
productivity. Additionally, they will be responsible for recruitment and training of new 
employees. Please think carefully about the applicant’s qualifications for this position of 
office manager while reviewing the resume. You will be asked about this information 
later.
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Work Ethic Beliefs and Hiring: Low Quality Resume  
-------------------------------, Des Moines, IA 50317 • 515-450---  -- • n                ame@gmail.com 
Experience 
08/2008 - Current Applebee’s Des Moines, IA 
Server 
Greeted guests at their tables, received their orders, and provided fast and courteous service. 
Made sure to observe tables carefully in order to meet every customers’ needs.  
 
07/2007 – 08/2008 McDonalds Des Moines, IA 
Cashier/Cook  
Primary duties included operating a register, counting down tills at the end of shifts, preparing 
meals for customers, including sandwich preparation and operating the fryer.   
05/2007 – 07/2007 Red Lobster Des Moines, IA 
Host 
Greeted guests, showed them to their tables, and provided menus. Coordinated seating in the 
dining area to ensure fast and courteous service. Scheduled reservations and prepared for large 
groups.   
Education 
AA in Business Administration from Northeast Iowa Community College, 2007 
 GPA 3.23 
References 
References are available on request. 
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Work Ethic Beliefs and Hiring: High Quality Resume  
-------------------------------, Des Moines, IA 50317 • 515-450----- • n                ame@gmail.com 
 
Experience 
08/2008 - Current Applebee’s Des Moines, IA 
Restaurant Manager 
Directed restaurant operations, including employee scheduling and setting/obtaining sales goals. 
Duties also included employee training, managing customer relations, and monitoring food 
quality to ensure a positive dining experience for every guest.  
 
07/2007 – 08/2008 McDonalds Des Moines, IA 
Shift Supervisor 
Primary duties included operating a register, counting down tills at the end of shifts, monitoring 
other employees, and ensuring that the grill area was performing quickly and efficiently.  
 
05/2007 – 07/2007 Red Lobster Des Moines, IA 
Management Internship 
Experience in all areas of the restaurant, including working at least one shift in each crew 
member position (such as wait staff, cook, and bartender) in addition to observing and 
working with management. Had the opportunity to manage a group of employees under the 
guidance of an experienced manager. Training in effectively interacting with customers, 
employees, and higher-level management.  
 
Education 
BA in Management from Iowa State University, 2007 
 GPA 3.73 
 Graduated with Distinction 
References 
References are available on request. 
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Work Ethic Beliefs and Hiring: Thought Listing Task Instructions 
 
Thought listing task: 
 
We are also interested in what you were thinking about while reviewing the resume. On 
the remainder of this page are lines provided for your thoughts and ideas. Write down the 
first idea that comes to your mind on the first line; begin on a separate line for the second 
thought/idea, a separate line for the third idea, etc. You should only try to write down 
only those ideas you were thinking about while reviewing the resume. Please write your 
thoughts and ideas as complete as possible…a phrase is sufficient. Don't worry about 
spelling and grammar. We have provided more space than we think most people will 
need to ensure that everyone would have plenty of room to write all of their ideas down, 
so don’t' worry if you don't fill every line. Please be completely honest and list all of the 
thoughts you had. 
 
 
 
 
Work Ethic Beliefs and Hiring: Resume Quality Ratings (Manipulation Check) 
Please answer the following questions about the quality of the resume you reviewed:  
1.) Using the scale below please rate the quality of the resume  
Very low 
quality 
     Very high 
quality 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
2.) How do you think this resume rates in comparison to an average resume? 
Significantly 
below 
average 
     Significantly 
above 
average 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Work Ethic Beliefs and Hiring: Impressions and Hiring Recommendations 
Now that you reviewed the applicant’s materials, please answer the following questions. 
   
In general, how good or bad of an employee do you think the applicant might be? 
 
Bad      Good 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
In general, how positive or negative would you say your impression of the applicant is? 
 
Very 
negative 
     Very 
positive 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
How favorable or unfavorable is your impression of the applicant? 
 
Very 
unfavorable 
     Very 
favorable 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
1.) I would recommend hiring this applicant. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2.) This applicant is qualified for the job position described. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3.) Hiring this applicant would be a risk for the employer. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Work Ethic Beliefs and Hiring: Protestant Work Ethic Scale 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements.  Use the 
scale provided. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
1. Most people spend too much time in unprofitable amusements. 
2. Our society would have fewer problems if people had less leisure time. 
3. Money acquired easily is usually spent unwisely. 
4. Most people who don't succeed in life are just plain lazy. 
3. Anyone who is willing and able to work hard has a good chance of succeeding. 
6. People who fail at a job have usually not tried hard enough. 
7. Life would have very little meaning if we never had to suffer. 
8. The person who can approach an unpleasant task with enthusiasm is the person who 
gets ahead. 
9. If people work hard enough they are likely to make a good life for themselves. 
10. I feel uneasy when there is little work for me to do. 
11. A distaste for hard work usually reflects a weakness of character. 
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Work Ethic Beliefs and Hiring: Demographics and Manipulation Check 
Please complete the following questions: 
 
What is your age?  _____ 
What is your sex?   Male    Female 
What is your class level?   Freshman   Sophomore   Junior   Senior   Graduate 
What is your ethnicity?   
White   African-American   Hispanic/Latino   Asian/Asian American   Native American   
Biracial   Other 
Is English your first language?  Yes    No 
How would you describe your socio-economic status?    
Lower Class   Lower-Middle Class   Middle Class   Upper-Middle Class   Upper Class 
How would you describe your political ideology? 
Very Conservative   Conservative   Middle of the road   Liberal   Very Liberal  
What political party, if any, are you a member of? 
Democrat   Republican   Independent   Green   Other   None 
In the study that you just completed, what was the job applicant’s race?  
White   African-American    
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APPENDIX B: JUST-WORLD BELIEFS AND ATTITUDES TOWARD PEOPLE 
LIVING WITH HIV/AIDS – STUDY MATERIALS 
 
Just-World Beliefs and Attitudes toward People Living with HIV and AIDS: Study 
2 Vignettes 
Exposure to Infected Medical Equipment: Low Onset Controllability 
Condition 
Mike is a 25-year-old (gay/heterosexual) male recently diagnosed with HIV, the 
virus that leads to AIDS. Mike became infected with HIV while working at a hospital 
where he was accidentally stuck with a needle that had been used on an HIV positive 
patient. Mike does not have health insurance to pay for prescriptions needed to slow the 
progression of the disease so he is applying to a program that provides free prescription 
drug coverage for people with HIV and AIDS. However, the program has very limited 
funding and cannot accept everyone who applies.  
 
Infection through Unsafe Sex: High Onset Controllability Condition  
Mike is a 25-year-old (gay/heterosexual) male recently diagnosed with HIV, the 
virus that leads to AIDS. He believes that he was exposed to HIV when he chose to have 
unprotected sex with someone he later learned was HIV positive. Mike does not have 
health insurance to pay for prescriptions needed to slow the progression of the disease so 
he is applying to a program that provides free prescription drug coverage for people with 
HIV and AIDS. However, the program has very limited funding and cannot accept 
everyone who applies.  
Note. Text in italics is manipulated across conditions. 
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Just-World Beliefs and Attitudes toward People Living with HIV and AIDS:  
Questions Regarding Admittance to the Prescription Drug Coverage Program 
(Study 2) 
Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements: 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Strongly 
Agree 
1. Mike should be admitted to the program 
for prescription drug coverage. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Other people deserve to be admitted to 
the prescription drug program more than 
Mike 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. Mike deserves to receive free prescription 
drug coverage. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Just-World Beliefs and Attitudes toward People Living with HIV and AIDS:  
Questions Regarding Admittance to the Prescription Drug Coverage Program 
(Study 3) 
Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements: 
 Strongly 
Disagree Disagree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Agree Strongly Agree 
1. Mike should be admitted to the program 
for free prescription drug coverage. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Mike deserves to receive free prescription 
drug coverage. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Others deserve free prescription drug 
coverage more than Mike.  1 2 3 4 5 
4. Admitting Mike to the free prescription 
drug coverage program would be wrong. 1 2 3 4 5 
5. Mike is entitled to receive free 
prescription drug coverage.  1 2 3 4 5 
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Just-World Beliefs and Attitudes toward People Living with HIV and AIDS:  
Attitudes toward Gay Men (Studies 2 and 3) 
Below are 10 statements regarding gay men. Please read each statement and decide to 
what extent you agree or disagree with it, then circle the corresponding number to the 
right of the statement.  
 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Strongly 
Agree 
1. Male homosexual couples should be 
allowed to adopt children the same as 
heterosexual couples 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. I think male homosexual couples are 
disgusting 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Male homosexual couples should not be 
allowed to teach school 1 2 3 4 5 
4. Male homosexuality is a perversion 1 2 3 4 5 
5. Male homosexuality is a natural 
expression of sexuality in men 1 2 3 4 5 
6. If a man has homosexual feelings, he 
should do everything he can to overcome 
them 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. I would not be too upset if I learned that 
my son was a homosexual 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. Sex between two men is just plain 
wrong 1 2 3 4 5 
9. The idea of male homosexual marriages 
seems ridiculous to me 1 2 3 4 5 
10. Male homosexuality is merely a 
different kind of lifestyle that should not 
be condemned 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Just-World Beliefs and Attitudes toward People Living with HIV and AIDS: Beliefs 
Regarding Sexual Orientation as a Choice (Study 2) 
Please circle whether you believe the following statement is true or false: 
1. Sexual orientation is a choice     True  False 
 
Just-World Beliefs and Attitudes toward People Living with HIV and AIDS: Beliefs 
Regarding Sexual Orientation as a Choice (Study 3) 
Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements: 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Strongly 
Agree 
1. Gay men choose to be gay. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Gay men have little control over 
their sexual orientation. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. Gay men can become heterosexual 
if they try hard enough. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Just-World Beliefs and Attitudes toward People Living with HIV and AIDS: 
Demographic Information and Manipulation Check (Study 2) 
Please complete the following demographic questions: 
Age: _____ 
Sex:   Male    Female 
Sexual Orientation:   Heterosexual     Lesbian or gay male     Bisexual     Other 
Are you a college student?   Yes     No  
If yes what is your class level?   Freshman   Sophomore   Junior   Senior   Graduate 
Do you know a friend, family member, or good acquaintance who is HIV+ or has AIDS?  
Yes     No     Do not wish to answer 
Do you know someone else who is HIV+ or has AIDS?   
Yes     No     Do not wish to answer 
Do you know someone who has died from AIDS?   
Yes     No     Do not wish to answer 
Are you HIV+ or have AIDS?   
Yes     No     Do not wish to answer 
In the past four years have you had sexual intercourse* with a person of the opposite sex?  
Yes     No     Do not wish to answer 
In the past four years have you had unprotected sex* with a person of the opposite sex?  
Yes     No     Do not wish to answer 
In the past four years has anyone coerced or forced you to have sex?  
Yes     No     Do not wish to answer 
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In the past four years have you had sexual intercourse with a person of the same sex?  
Yes     No     Do not wish to answer 
In the past four years have you had unprotected sex with a person of the same sex? 
Yes     No     Do not wish to answer 
Have you ever been tested for HIV? 
Yes     No     Do not wish to answer 
Have you ever been tested for a sexually transmitted disease? 
Yes     No     Do not wish to answer 
Have you ever worried that you may have gotten HIV from someone? 
Yes     No     Do not wish to answer 
*Sexual intercourse and sex above includes both vaginal and/or anal intercourse. 
 
Please answer the following questions about the person described in the vignette: 
What is Mike’s sexual orientation?   Heterosexual   Gay   Bisexual   Not sure 
How did Mike become infected with HIV?    
Unprotected sex   Exposure to infected medical equipment   Not sure 
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Just-World Beliefs and Attitudes toward People Living with HIV and AIDS: 
Demographic Information and Manipulation Check (Study 3) 
Please complete the following demographic questions: 
What is your age?  _____ 
What is your sex?   Male    Female 
What is your class level?   Freshman   Sophomore   Junior   Senior   Graduate 
What is your ethnicity?   
White   African-American   Hispanic/Latino   Asian/Asian American   Native American   
Biracial   Other 
How would you describe your socio-economic status?    
Lower Class   Lower-Middle Class   Middle Class   Upper-Middle Class   Upper Class 
How would you describe your political ideology? 
Very Conservative   Conservative   Middle of the road   Liberal   Very Liberal  
What political party, if any, are you a member of? 
Democrat   Republican   Independent   Green   Other   None 
What is your sexual orientation?   Heterosexual     Lesbian or gay male     Bisexual     Other 
What is your marital status?  Single     Married     Domestic Partnership or Civil Union     
Separated     Divorced 
Do you have children?  Yes     No 
Do you have health insurance?  Yes     No     Unsure 
Do you support the movement for a public health care option?   Yes     No     Unsure 
Do you support President Obama’s push for health care reform?   Yes     No     Unsure 
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Do you know a friend, family member, or good acquaintance who is HIV+ or has AIDS?   
Yes     No     Do not wish to answer 
Do you know someone else who is HIV+ or has AIDS?   
Yes     No     Do not wish to answer 
Do you know someone who has died from AIDS?  Yes     No     Do not wish to answer 
Are you HIV+ or have AIDS?  Yes     No     Do not wish to answer 
In the past four years have you had sexual intercourse with a person of the opposite sex?   
Yes     No     Do not wish to answer 
In the past four years have you had unprotected sex with a person of the opposite sex?   
Yes     No     Do not wish to answer 
In the past four years have you had sexual intercourse with a person of the same sex?  
Yes     No     Do not wish to answer 
In the past four years have you had unprotected sex with a person of the same sex? 
Yes     No     Do not wish to answer 
Have you ever been tested for a sexually transmitted disease?  
 Yes    No     Do not wish to answer 
Have you ever been tested for HIV?  Yes     No     Do not wish to answer 
Have you ever worried that you may have gotten HIV from someone? 
Yes     No     Do not wish to answer 
Please answer the following questions about the person described in the vignette: 
What is Mike’s sexual orientation?   Heterosexual   Gay    
How did Mike become infected with HIV?   Unprotected Sex   Blood Transfusion    
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APPENDIX C: JUST-WORLD BELIEFS, JUSTICE RELATED PRIMES, AND 
VICTIM BLAME – STUDY MATERIALS 
Just-World Beliefs, Justice Related Primes, and Victim Blame: Value Priming Task 
(Studies 4 and 5) 
This brief study is related to word meaning.  Communication is a complicated process 
and even simple words can have slightly different meanings to people. The current study 
is interested in how people think about particular words, or what those words mean to 
people. On this page, you will be presented with a series of words, and each word will be 
followed by three other words that were similar to the first word. Your task is to read 
each word carefully and circle one of the three following words seem most similar to the 
first word. Please keep in mind that there are no right or wrong answers—all of the three 
words are similar to the first word—and you are simply to indicate which of those words 
seems most similar to you. 
 
Blend 
a) mix 
b) combine 
c) infuse 
 
Justice 
a) compensation 
b) evenness 
c) truth 
 
Table 
a) bench 
b) agenda 
c) put aside 
 
Entitlement 
a) merits 
b) right 
c) liberty 
 
Prepare 
a) develop 
b) formulate 
c) plan 
 
 
 
 
Equality 
a) balance 
b) fairness 
c) impartiality 
Common 
a) average 
b) natural  
c) simple
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Just-World Beliefs, Justice Related Primes, and Victim Blame: Neutral Priming 
Task (Studies 4 and 5) 
This brief study is related to word meaning.  Communication is a complicated process 
and even simple words can have slightly different meanings to people. The current study 
is interested in how people think about particular words, or what those words mean to 
people. On this page, you will be presented with a series of words, and each word will be 
followed by three other words that were similar to the first word. Your task is to read 
each word carefully and circle one of the three following words seem most similar to the 
first word. Please keep in mind that there are no right or wrong answers—all of the three 
words are similar to the first word—and you are simply to indicate which of those words 
seems most similar to you. 
 
Blend 
a) mix 
b) combine 
c) infuse 
 
Home 
a) house 
b) city 
c) family 
 
Table 
a) bench 
b) agenda 
c) put aside 
 
March 
a) month 
b) parade 
c) step 
 
Prepare 
a) develop 
b) formulate 
c) plan 
 
Hammer 
a) tool 
b) nail 
c) saw 
 
 
 
 
Common 
a) average 
b) natural  
c) simple 
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Just-World Beliefs, Justice Related Primes, and Victim Blame: Victim Description 
(Studies 4 and 5) 
Instructions:  For this part of the study, you will be asked to read a brief story about a 
person named Tom.  After reading the story, you will be asked to rate your feelings about 
Tom.   
As an undergraduate at the University of Alabama, Tom was considered by many to be 
an average student.  His commitment to his education wavered at times and he found 
himself distracted by activities like spending time with friends at social gatherings, so 
average grades were good enough for him.  Tom completed most of his assignments, but 
tried to do so while spending as little time in class as possible.  He was liked by his 
classmates and peers, and was seen as somewhat popular because of his outgoing 
personality.  However, there were times when Tom’s jokes made others feel a little 
uncomfortable.  Upon graduating with a degree in business, Tom took the first job he was 
offered, a position at a local computer retail store.  After several months of working at the 
store, Tom became a close friend of the store manager, who liked Tom’s outgoing 
personality.  The manager decided to move Tom into a managerial trainee position.  Tom 
was excited about the possibility of increasing his income.  Eventually, when the store 
manager was moved to a higher position in the company, he transferred in another 
manager from a nearby store instead of moving Tom into the position.  Tom ended up 
being laid off and eventually applied for welfare. 
 
Just-World Beliefs, Justice Related Primes, and Victim Blame: Victim Blame  
(Study 4) 
Instructions:  Please provide your opinion of Tom using the scales provided below. 
 
In your view, how much did Tom deserve his current job status?   
1                2                3                4                5               6               7               8               9 
Not at all                                                                                                               Very much  
 
In your view, how responsible was Tom for his current job status? 
1                2                3                4                5               6               7               8               9 
   Not at all                                                                                                            Very much  
Responsible                                                                                                         Responsible 
 
How much do you feel Tom’s current job status was the result of Tom’s own doing? 
1                2                3                4                5               6               7               8               9 
Very little                                                                                                                    A great 
                                                                                                                                      deal 
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Just-World Beliefs, Justice Related Primes, and Victim Blame: Victim Blame  
(Study 5) 
Instructions:  Please provide your opinion of Tom using the scales provided below. 
 
In your view, how responsible was Tom for his current job status? 
1                2                3                4                5               6               7               8               9 
   Not at all                                                                                                            Very much  
Responsible                                                                                                         Responsible 
 
How much do you feel Tom’s current job status was the result of Tom’s own doing? 
1                2                3                4                5               6               7               8               9 
Very little                                                                                                                    A great 
                                                                                                                                       deal  
 
Just-World Beliefs, Justice Related Primes, and Victim Blame: Victim Derogation 
(Study 5) 
Instructions:  Now that you have read about Tom, we would like you to rate him on a 
number of characteristics.  Using the scale provided below, please write a number that 
best represents the extent to which you think Tom has the following characteristics.   
 1               2               3               4              5               6                7                 8                 9 
 Not at all                                                                                                                        Very 
 Characteristic                                                                                                  Characteristic 
 of Tom                                                                                                                       of Tom 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____ alert 
____ unintelligent 
____ careless 
____ rational 
____ clear-thinking 
____ initiative 
____ confident 
____ irresponsible 
____ confused 
____ kind 
____ conscientious 
____ undependable 
____ hasty 
____ obnoxious 
____ impatient 
____ weak 
____ resourceful 
____ dependable 
____ self-controlled 
____ self-centered 
____ determined 
____ trusting  
____ greedy  
____ warm  
____ cheerful 
____ selfish 
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Just-World Beliefs, Justice Related Primes, and Victim Blame: Global Belief in a 
Just World Scale (Studies 4 and 5) 
Instructions:  Please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements.  
Please use the scale provided.   
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
 
_______ I feel that people get what they are entitled to have. 
_______ I feel that a person’s efforts are noticed and rewarded. 
_______ I feel that people earn the rewards and punishments they get. 
_______ I feel that people who have met with misfortune have brought it on themselves. 
_______ I feel that people get what they deserve. 
_______ I feel that rewards and punishments are fairly given. 
_______ I basically feel that the world is a fair place. 
 
 
